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This dissertation will deal with the issue of the award of custody and access of
children on divorce to parents who are gay or lesbian. l The latter may sometimes
enter into heterosexual marriages, as they attempt to appease society or because they
are uncertain about their sexual orientation. Should they realize that their
homosexuality is not just a phase they may terminate the marriage.2 A termination of
such a marriage has serious legal consequences, especially for the children of such a
union.
We live in a society where homophobia is rife. The homophobic culture has had a
substantial effect on gay and lesbian parents to such an extent that some lesbians have
become uncertain about their own abilities as parents.3 This internalized homophobia
causes the lesbian mother not only to doubt her motherhood capability but to question
the consequences of the absence of a father.4 The reasons for such homophobia are
varied. Fayer5 argues that one such reason is that society has definite stereotypical
roles for the male and female. Not being just homophobic, but also patriarchal, our
society sees an effeminate male and a "butch',6 female as being inappropriate and a
threat to the norm of heterosexuality. This factor transcends into the area of child
custody because as will be discussed in Chapter I, heterosexual parents are concerned
about their children deviating from their particular role.
) Anyone who is erotically attracted to members ofhis or her own sex. E.Cameron 'Sexual Orientation
ofthe Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights' (1993) South African Law Journal 450, at 452.
2 M.A Fayer 'Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes and
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gays' (1992) 46 Unversity ofMiami Law Review 511, at 617.
3 V.L Neophytou 'Lesbian Mothers'(1994) 22 Agenda 24, at 25 -26.
4 Ibid.
s Fayer op cit note 2, at 617.
6 Having a masculine appearance and way ofbehaving like a man The Oxford Dictionary 5ed (1995)
153.
The common law crime of sodomy perpetuated homophobia. Roman-Dutch law
rendered the crime punishable by death.7 Louw8 refers to both Van der Linden and
Van Leeuwen who specify the punishment for sodomy which was the burning of the
offender to death. When the offence continued and was still very prevalent, the State
of Holland resorted to punishing the offenders in public. Homophobia also has its
roots in strong religious beliefs.9 Burchell and MiltonIO submit that most conservative
religions postulated sexual activity between gays and lesbians as a sin. Similarly,
Roman-Dutch writers referred to sodomy as being contrary to divine laws. I1
A further factor that has contributed to homophobia, is the Acquired Immune
Deficiency SYlldromeI2 epidemic, thus impacting on the rights of gay and lesbian
parents. There have been some courts in America that have refused to grant custody to
gay and lesbian parents because of the possible exposure to the virus. Underlying such
fear is the assumption that gays and lesbians are more prone to contacting mv than
heterosexuals.13 There are no data to confmn such an assumption. It is promiscuity
which has allowed the virus to reach such alarming proportions, the promiscuity of
both heterosexuals and gays and lesbains. Hunter14 describes it as a 'behaviourally
based disease'. There is a perception that gays and lesbians are unstable and
promiscuous by nature, having an innate inability to form stable, permanent
relationships. Yet this same society objects to these relationships and the law refuses
7 R Louw 'Sexual Orientation, the Right to Equality and the Common-Law Offence ofSodomy: S v
Kampher 1997 (2 ) SACR 418 (C)' (1998) 11 South African Journal ofCriminal Justice 112.
8 Ibid.
9 The Bible, Leviticus Chapter 20 verse 13 Ifa man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of
them have done what is detestable.
10 J Burchell and J Milton Principles ofCriminal Law 2ed (1997) 632-4.
11 Op cit note 7, at 112.
12 Hereinafter referred to as AIDS.
13 S.P Ali 'Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption' (1989) 22 University of California,
Davis 1009 at 1019.
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to acknowledge them. It is submitted that if there were any truth to society's
perceptions, the fear of the deadly virus would surely cause gays and lesbians to
reconsider their position. Hence many gays and lesbians understanding the dangers of
promiscuity, would be looking for more stable relationships and would be more eager
to raise children.
In Chapter I, the writer examines whether environment does indeed determine one's
sexual orientation. It could be argued on the one hand, that if environment influenced
sexual orientation then a parent ought to have a right to control the development ofhis
child's sexual orientation. A parent may want to bring up his or her child with certain
values or beliefs to which he adheres. He or she may uphold certain religious beliefs,
which he may teach and inculcate in his child. Such a parent may for example be a
teetotaler and would expect the same from the other parent and would generally steer
his child away from alcohol. Whether that child becomes an adult who uses alcohol,
is ultimately dependent on the child, but his environment and teachings in life, would
play some role in that fmal decision, likewise for the gay and lesbian. Upon divorce,
the religion of the children is the one that the family would have followed because
change is contrary to the interests of the child. is Similarly, a heterosexual parent
would argue that the children ought be in a nuclear family type to perpetuate the status
quo. The reality is, is that there are very few nuclear families in South Africa. In
view of the alarming statistic of divorce rates, there are many single parents and other
non-traditional families. Heterosexual parents need to appreciate that we have a
Constitution founded on democracy, equality and tolerance. Chapter I also
14 J Hunter 'The High Price of Homophobia: mv Prevention Education' lll'TP: http: II www.avert.
orgl gay statu. htm.
15 Charmani v Charmani 2 July 1979 WLD 227/79 unreported.
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investigates the possibility of a homosexual environment causing gender role or
gender-identity crisis.
In Chapter IT the writer examines the South African laws concerning custody and
access of gay and lesbian parents. A historical study was fITst conducted. In light of
there being no historical studies on custody cases where the parent is gay or lesbian,
the writer traced the development of South African custody law of heterosexuals. A
comparison was drawn between custody cases where the parent is heterosexual as
opposed to when the parent is homosexual. The court's denial of custody to gay and
lesbian parents can only be justified if there is a rational relationship between denial
of custody and access to the gay or lesbian parent and protection of the child, from
harm. I6 Gays and lesbians have rights in terms of the ConstitutionI7 but these rights
can be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, if it is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors. There is a shift in South African
family law from parental rights to parental responsibility and children s' rights. I8 In
terms of section 28 of the Constitution the interests of the child are paramount. It
could be argued that since parents have a legal duty to their children, does this duty
not entitle them to protect their child from harm? When one of the parents in a
custody dispute is gay or lesbian, the heterosexual parent usually disapproves of the
other obtaining custody on the basis of his or her sexual orientation. The concerns of
the parents vary and many of them are genuinely concerned for the welfare of the
16 Harksen v Laine No and others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), at 320.
17 Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa Act 200 of 1993.
18 V V V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C) at 176 see also F.J Bosman and G.J Van Zyl Children, Young
Persons and their Parents in lA Robinson The Law of Children and Young Persons led (1997) 50.
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children. One of the concerns of the heterosexual parent is that the children would
become gay or lesbian if they lived in a gay or lesbian environment.
19
Chapter III , presents a comparative study of custody and access disputes of
homosexual parents in foreign jurisdictions, namely Australia, Canada and America.
As opposed to the latter countries, South Africa has just started to deal with such
cases, it would therefore be beneficial to draw from the experience of foreign courts in
setting standards and guidelines in custody disputes.
This dissertation also serves to inform and appraise all officers of the court including
judges, family advocates, magistrates, child care agencies and social workers of the
ability of the gay and lesbian as parents. Previously officers of the Court in ignorance
have acted to the prejudice of the gay or lesbian parent. A case which illustrates this,
is Greyling v Minister ofWelfare and Population Development and Others,20 a case
which involved social workers and the magistrate. In Chapter 11 the writer investigates
the myths and fears surrounding homosexuality and establishes whether such a child
is indeed in "need of care." This thesis also serves to contribute to expert evidence
each time a custody dispute ofthis nature comes to court.
19 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (3) SA 201 (C)
Vv V 1998 (4) SA 169 CPD.




This study was undertaken because many parents fear that allowing their children to
live with a gay or lesbian parent would cause the child to become gay or lesbian.
Often in gay and lesbian custody disputes the latter has been an issue of concern.
Baehr v Mike, l was an application to the Supreme Court ofthe United States of
America to recognise same-sex marriages. Applications by the plaintiffs to the
Department ofHealth for marriage licenses were refused. The State alleged that it
had a "compelling interest to promote the optimal development ofchildren,,2 This
would not be achieved if the children lived in a gay or lesbian household.
In the South African case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,3 the judge was concerned that
the mother's lesbianism would expose the children to "confusing signals". This
suggests that there was a concern about the role that the lesbian environment would
play in the child's development. SteYn4 submits that there is a fear that children
growing up in a gay or lesbian household would also become gay. The question
ultimately is, is it within the ability ofthe child to assume the sexual orientation ofthe
gay or lesbian parent. In order to develop some ofthe ideas, the psychological and
genetic aspects of homosexuality will be discussed below.
11996 WL 694235 (Hew. Cir. et. 1996).
2 Ibid, at para 49.
3 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 328 C-D.
4 E Steyn 'From Closet to Constitution: The South African Gay Family Rights Odyssey' 1998 The




For many years there has been a theory that predisposition to homosexuality is
partly genetic. In 1986, a study by Pillard and Weinrich reported that there
was a higher rate of homosexuality amongst gay and lesbian brothers.5 In a
more recent study by Hamer et al 114 families of gay and lesbian men were
studied to determine whether sexual orientation is genetically determined.
They found that there was a higher rate ofhomosexuality in gay men and their
brothers as compared to the general population. It was also found that there
was a higher rate of homosexuality amongst the maternal uncles and the sons
of maternal aunts. This provided a strong case that homosexuality was linked
to the x> chromosome. The chromosomes that determine sex are called X and
Y. A male inherits an X from his mother and a Y from his father. A female
gets an X from both parents. Researchers concluded that because
homosexuality appears to be derived from the mother's side of the family,
homosexuality is related to the X chromosome.
5 RC Friedman and J Downey 'Psychoanalysis, Psychology and Homosexuality' (1993) 41 Journal of
American Psychoanalytica 1159, at 1165.
6 D.H Hamer, V.L Magnuson and A.M Pattatucci 'A linkage between DNA markers on the X
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation' (1993) 261 Science 321.
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A further study of the DNA from 40 pairs of gay brothers was carried out, 33
pairs of brothers out of the 40 shared the same sequence of DNA.
7
Another
linkage study8 was carried out by Hamer et al.9 They found that there was a
linkage between the Xq28 chromosome10 and sexual orientation in the gay
male families but not in the lesbian families and concluded that their
preliminary studyll linking Xq28 to sexual orientation was confIrmed.
However, this is only in the case ofmen and not women.
However, the genetic theory has been received with mixed feelings within the
scientifIc world and the gay community. Donald Suggs, head ofthe New York
Chapter of Gay and Lesbian Alliance against Defamation, is perplexed that
homosexuality has to be justifIed as if it is an abnormal human trait. l2 Baron
expresses a doubt as to whether a single gene or a particular mechanism can
explain the complexity of homosexuality. 13
The linkage study has a double-edged sword; on the one hand, it proves that
homosexuality is an immutable human trait like race or colour hence gays and
lesbians should not be discriminated against; on the other hand because a
gay's sexual orientation is determined by genes and they are in the minority,
7 Ibid.
8 Investigation into a possible correlatirn between the X chromosome and homosexuality.
9 D.H Hamer, AM Pattatucci, C Patterson, D.W Fulker, S.S Cherny and L Kruglyak 'Linkage between
Sexual Orientation and Chromosome Xq28 in Males but not in Females' (1995) 11 (3) Nature
Genetics 248.
10 Long Arm ofthe sex chromosome.
11 Ramer op cit note 6.
12 W.A Henry ill 'Born Gay' (July 1993) Times 52, at 55.
13 M Baron 'Genetic Linkage and Male Homosexual Orientation' (1993) British Medical Journal 337.
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some will regard this difference as being pathological. This is regarded as
biomedical discrimination.
If it is accepted that homosexuality is genetically determined, it may
encourage the tampering of genes of individuals who are gay and it may also
encourage screening in early pregnancy with a view to aborting gay or lesbian
foetuses. Sinha expresses a similar fear. She maintains that in a country like
India where a foetus is aborted just because the child is female, makes the
future look certainly grim for a foetus, diagnosed gay or lesbian. I4
Hamer's study was repeated at the University of Western Ontario and this
time, no linkage was found between the X chromosome and sexual
orientation. It is argued that the prevalence ofhomosexuality on the maternal
side amounted to nothing more than the fact, that women have more
knowledge of their relatives than men do, a fact that has long been established
by sociologists. I5 There is also a fear that Hamer extracted such findings
because of his own bias as he was gay himself. 16
Research carried out on twins also suggests that there is a genetic influence on
gay and lesbian orientation. A distinction must be made between monozygotic
and dyzygotic twinS. I7 Monozygotic twins, being identical in nature, have the
14 S Sinha 'Is Homosexuality Genetically Determined?' (1994) 7 The National Medical Journal of
India 173, at 174.
15 (October 1995) Gene Scam? 'The Guide' (on line) available HITP:http/www.Guide
may.comm/newslantiGene.
16 Ibid.
17 Monozygotic twins are twins conceived from one egg both embryos from one egg Dizygotic twins-
fusion oftwo eggs with two sperms.
9
same genetic composition. Studies18 have shown that the concordance of
homosexuality rates is higher in monozygotic twins than in dyzygotic twins, in
other words, monozygotic twins generally have the same sexual orientation.
They have the same genetic composition and hence the same sexual
orientation. In certain instances, identical twins that were separated at birth,
and reared apart displayed concordance for homosexuality. This has also
suggested a genetic component for sexual orientation because it removes the
argument that monozygotic twins share the same orientation because of a
similar environment. In a study by Eckert et aI, the subjects were
monozygotic twins who had been raised apart. 19 Here again it was interesting
to see the difference between female and male gays and lesbians. All the
female pairs were discordant for homosexual behaviour in other words, the
twins did not share their sexual orientation but were instead, heterosexual.
Eckert concluded that female homosexuality may be an acquired trait and
attributable to environmental factors. Juxtaposed to this, a study of the male
pairs confmned earlier research that the concordance rates for sexual
orientation amongst monozygotic pairs is higher than in dyzygotic pairs even
when the twins are raised apart.20 This indicated that even in different
environments, if one monozygotic male is gay, there is a greater probability
that his twin is also gay.
18 J.M Bailey and RC Pillard 'A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientatioo' (1991) 48 Archives of
General Psychiatry 1089.
N Buhrich, IM Bailey and N.G Martin 'Sexual Orientation, Sexual Identity and Sexually
Dimorphic Behaviours in Male Twins' (1991) 21 Behavioural Genetics 75.
19 E.D Eckert, T.J Bouchard, J Bohler and L.R Heston 'Homosexuality in Monozygotic Twins Reared
Apart' (1986) 148 British Journal ofPsychiatry 421.
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Another research project undertaken relating to the Nature v Nurture debate is
one that concerns fmgerprinting. Although each individual has a unique set of
fmgerprints Richard Green et a/ have made some phenomenal findings. 21
Although both men and women have more ridges on their right hand than their
left, women have fewer ridges on their right hand than men, Richard Green et
al concluded, after an examination of 300 fingerprints of gay men, "more than
a third have significantly fewer ridges on their right thumb than their
heterosexual counterparts. ,,22 Fingerprints are formed about two or three
months after a baby has been conceived.
Fruit flies are the most sexually active creatures on earth hence their genetic
pattern was studied to see if there was any link to homosexuality. They have
the ability to produce a new generation in two weeks and are therefore often
used by genetic researchers. In a study by Zhang and Odenwald, the genetic
make-up of the male fruit flies was altered hence their sexual behaviour was
altered. The biologists transplanted a gene (called the White gene) into the
male fruit flies and this caused a need for amino acids called Tryptophan.
Every cell began to absorb the Tryptophan, which caused a shortage of the
amino acids in the brain, which ultimately had an effect on the levels of
serotonin in the body. Serotonin is a neurotransmitter that carries messages
between the nerve cells. The effect ofall this was that male fruit flies formed a
laager end to end with their genitals rubbing against each other. It is
20 Ibid, at 424.
21 Z Brennan 'The Imprint ofYour Sexuality' (5 February 1998) Sunday Tribune 5.
11
interesting to note that the experiment did not have a similar effect on female
fruit flies. The transplant of the White gene did not result in lesbian activity.
Serotonin is also a neurotransmitter found in human beings, hence the link
between the investigation and human beings.
23
1.2.2 Hormones and Homosexuality
Researchers into animal sexual behaviour have concluded that a prenatal
androgen deficit results in male homosexuality, while a prenatal androgen
excess results in female homosexuality.24 Dorner conducted research on male
rats. He castrated the animals at birth and injected them with the male
hormone androgen in adulthood. These animals displayed gay behaviour. The
female rats were injected with androgen before birth and these rats displayed
lesbian behaviour as well.25
According to studies by Dorner et al there are different regions of the brain,
which are responsible for male and female sexual behaviour. Dorner was of
the opinion that altered levels of sex hormones during a critical period ofbrain
development could influence sexual orientation.26 Dorner is also of the
opinion that sexual orientation is biologically determined and he discards both
22 Ibid.
23 S.D Zang and W.F Odenwald 'Misexpression ofthe whites (w) gene triggers mal~male courtship in
Drosphila' (1995) 92 Proc. National Academy Science. D.S.A. 5525.
24 R.e Friedman and J Downey 'Homosexuality' (1994) 331New England Journal ofMedicine 923, at
928.
25 Ibid, at 142.
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the theory of Social Learning and that of Psychoanalysis. He went to the
extent of advocating prevention of homosexuality by foetal hormone
treatment.27
Stress in pregnant mothers has the effect of a possible decrease of androgen
levels that reaches the foetus. A study was carried out by the Stahl et al.2
8
The
sample used was pregnant women in Berlin during World War IT over a five-
year period. The males born during the period were recorded to have a higher
rate of homosexuality than males born five years before or five years later.
29
These fmdings suggest that stresses during pregnancy have the ability to alter
sexual orientation.
However, another view that prevails is that androgen deficiency does not
automatically result in a predisposition for homosexuality. It would result in
effeminate features for example small genitals. This poor male physique may
deter any thought ofheterosexual encounters hence leading to gay behaviour.
The girlish and pretty appearance will also draw attention from other males
hence encouraging homosexuality. The position is somewhat different with
the female who has an excess of androgens. They have a tendency to become
26 G Domer, I Pappe, F Stabl, Kolzschj and R Uebelhack 'Gene and Environment Dependent
Neuroendocrine Etiogenesis' (1991) 98 Experimental Clinical Endocrinology 141 at 142.
27 Ibid, at 56.
28 F StabI, F Gotz, I Pappe, P Amendt and G Domer 'Pre-and Early Testosterone Levels in rat and
hlUllan, in honnones and brain development' edited by G Domer, M Kawakami, Amsterdam,
Elsevier, 1978 .
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tomboys and they have a masculine attitude and temperament, however they
enter into and maintain heterosexual relationships.30
1.2.3 Brain Differences
In 1991, Levay studied the brain tissue of eighteen gay and lesbian, sixteen
heterosexual males and six heterosexual females. He looked specifically at one
nucleus, the INAR3. The INAH3 is one of the cell groups found in the
anterior hypothalamus. The anterior hypothalamus of the brain participates in
the regulation of male-typical sexual behaviour.31 He found that the size of
the INAH3 was similar in women and gay men. The INAID was twice as
large in heterosexual men than in women and gay men?2 Levay maintains
that the size of that particular nucleus is established in early childhood and has
a direct effect on later adult sexual behaviour.33
Swaab looked at the suprachiasmatic nucleus in relation to sexual orientation.
The suprachiasmatic nucleus (SDN) is located at the base of the human brain.
Swaab's research indicates that the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SDN) in gay
men was 1.7 times larger than the reference group of male subjects and
contained 2.1. times as many cells as the latter group. Although such a
29 R Green 'The Best Interests ofthe Child with a Lesbian Mother' (1982) 10 Bulletin a/the AAPL 7, at
8.
30 D.G West 'Homosexuality Re-Examined' led (1977) 66.
31 S.A Levay 'A Difference in Hypothalmic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men'
1991 253 Science 1034.
32 Ibid, at 1035.
33 Friedman op cit note 5, at 1177-78.
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difference was recorded, Swaab was of the opinion that this was not directly
linked to sexual orientation.34 He disagreed with Dorner's35 hypothesis that
male gays have a 'female brain'. Swaab's conclusion was based on the fact
that even though there was a difference found in the SDN ofthe gay lesbian as
opposed to the other male subjects, the SDN found in males and females were
the same both in volume and in the number of cells contained. Therefore, an
enlarged SDN in the gay cannot possibly mean that it is tantamount to a
female brain.36
1.3 Social Learning Theory
The social learning theory emphasizes the need of a child to have both
heterosexual parents present for proper or "normal" psychosexual
development. Social learning theories postulate that there is a need for both
male and female models for children to acquire knowledge of gender roles.3?
According to the abovementioned theory there are two psychological
processes which are important for psychosexual development namely
modeling or emulating adults of the same sex and secondly differential
reinforcement that is rewarding children for behaviour which is appropriate to
34 D.F Swaab and M.A Hoffinan 'An Enlarged Suprachiasmatic Nucleus in Homosexual Men' (1990)
537 Brain Research 141.
35 G Domer 'Neuroendocrine response to Oestrogen and Brain Differentiation' (1988) 17 Archives of
Sexual Behaviour 57.
36 Swaab op cit note 34, at 146.
37 DJ Riddle 'Relating to Children: Gays and Role Models' (1978) 34 Journal ofSocial Issues 38, at
57.
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their sex. Many estranged heterosexual parents express fears in the courtrooms
that their gay and lesbian spouse will, by exposure, cause their children to
become gay or lesbian. Hence the court's justification for denial of custody
and access. There is, therefore, a need to look at the empirical evidence to see
whether these fears are properly based.
According to social learning theorists boys in a lesbian household will have
difficulties because of the absence of the father. There is no same sex model
and reinforcement will be quite different.
Further, it is believed that lesbians harbour negative feelings towards men.
However, as far as absence ofthe father or male contact is concerned, some of
the children in a lesbian household do have contact with their fathers whilst
others have contact with adult male friends of their mothers. This was evident
in a study by Colombok et al in which a third of the cases had weekly contact
with their fathers. Half the children had contact with male friends of their
mothers and the majority associated with friends of their mothers who were
both heterosexual and gay and lesbian.38 Regarding hostility towards men,
only a few of the lesbian women expressed negative attitudes in respect of
men.39
38 S Colombok, A Spencer and M Rutter 'Children in Lesbian and Single Parent Households :
Psychosexual and Psychiatric appraisal' (1983) 24 Journal ojChild Psychology and Psychiatry 551,
at 562, 569 and 570.
39 Ibid, at 570.
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It has been argued that children in a lesbian household are exposed to atypical
displays of sexual behaviour hence this would lead to the child's
homosexuality. However, this argument is refuted by the fact that exposure to
heterosexual behaviour does not prevent homosexuality.40
Studies indicate that there is a link between gender identity, gender role
behaviour and sexual orientation. Apart from such correlation, straight parents
are concerned that a homosexual environment would cause their children to be
confused about their gender identity. Gender identity is the child's
identification or self-awareness of being male or female. Gender role
behaviour is the behaviour of that child which best differentiates that child as
being male or fem~.l1e in a particular culture. Sexual orientation refers to a
person's choice of sexual partners.41 Although subject to some controversy,
data suggests that gender-role behaviour is linked to sexual orientation. If a
child has a gender identity disorder and wishes to be of the opposite sex and
displays stereotypical cross-gender behaviours then there is a higher than
average possibility of bisexual or homosexual behaviour in adulthood.42
KirkPatrick et al in their study found that there were no differences in gender
development between children reared in a lesbian household and those who
were reared by a heterosexual mother. However, she cautioned that gender
40 Colombok op cit note 38, at 553.
41 R Green The Best Interests ofthe Child with a Lesbian Mother' (1982) 10 American Academy of
Psychiatry and Law 7, at 11.
42 Ibid.
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identity and future sexual role could not be clearly established in childhood.
43
Colombok et al in a similar study found no evidence of cross-sex-typed
behaviours in both the lesbian and single parent households.
44
Colombok and
Tasker submitted that empirical studies are indicative of the fact that there are
no observable differences between the "lesbian offspring" and the
"heterosexual offspring".45
In detennining acquisition of sex role behaviour, Colombok conducted
interviews with the mothers and children of both the lesbian and heterosexual
household. Colombok maintains that even at a time when sex roles are not as
traditional as they used to be, in that more boys now do ballet and cook and
more girls play soccer, there are defmite sex differences in children's
behaviour. However, she found that there were no differences in gender role
behaviour in both groups.46 Green et al found some differences between the
two groups in toy and activity choice. There was more flexibility in the lesbian
household for female children in respect of traditional toys and other activities,
like rough and tumble play. But, Green maintains that this atypical behaviour
is not unusual for many other girls of the same age.47 Hoeffer's study is
indicative of the extent of the mothers' influence on their children's decisions.
The children from both groups were not very different in their choice. The
43 M Kirkpatric~ C Smith and R Roy, 'Lesbian Mothers and their Children : A Comparative Survey'
(1981) 51 American Journal ojOrthopsychiatry 545, at 551.
44 Colombok op cit note 38, at 561, 562 and 570.
45 EL Tasker and S Colombok 'Children Raised by Lesbian Mothers' (1991) Family Law 184, at 186.
46 Colombok op cit note 38, at 568.
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boys preferred same-gender sex-typed toys whilst the girls preferred more
neutral toys. The reason for this cross-gender choice is because boys are
prohibited or less encouraged to play with toys that are considered to be
feminine.48 In America, gender role behaviour for boys is strictly laid down.49
In the Hoeffer study both groups of mothers encouraged play with neutral
toys. The choice of the children was different from that of the mothers. A
majority of the mothers conceded that it was their children's peers rather than
themselves that influenced the children's decisions. The aforementioned is in
keeping with the Social Learning theory that various factors, and not
necessarily the parents, that influence the acquisition of sex role traits.50 It
must also be borne in mind that a child does not live in isolation and his
parents are not the only contact with the real world. Most children are avid
television viewers. Gottman conducted a study between three different groups
of adult females who were daughters of heterosexual mothers who divorced
and remarried, heterosexual mothers who divorced but did not remarry and
lesbian mothers to ascertain gender role preferences and found no differences
between the three groupS.51
47 R Green, H Gray and C Smith 'Lesbian Mothers and Their Children : A Comparison with Solo
Parent Heterosexual Mothers and their Children' (1986) 15 Archives of Sexual Behaviour 167, at
176, 177 and 180.
48 B Hoeffer 'Children's Acquisition of Sex Role Behaviour in Lesbian - Mother families' (1981) 51
American Journal ofOrthopsychiatry 536, at543.
49 R.C Friedman 'Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Homosexuality' (1991) 98 Experimental Clinical
Endocrinology 155, at 159.
50 Hoeffer op cit note 48, at 543.
5\ J.S Gottman 'Children ofGay and Lesbian Parents' (1990).
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KirkPatrick et a1 after looking at the history of play preferences and sexual
interest reported no differences in gender development.52 Patterson concluded
that as far as psychosexual development is concerned, there are no differences
between children of a lesbian household as compared with children of a
heterosexual household. The lesbian offspring usually develops a typical
psychosexual identity, being heterosexual in nature.53
Cross-gender behaviour has been linked to sexual orientation. Green studied
forty-four effeminate boys and found that of the forty-four, seventy five
percent later became gay or bisexual.54 Other studies have similar fmdings.
Some lesbians have indicated that they have also displayed in their childhood,
cross gender behaviour. However, studies indicate that there are more males as
opposed to females, exhibiting cross-gender behaviour who later become
gays.55
Isay in his clinical studies submits that just as a heterosexual boy emulates his
father in order to attract the attention of his mother and later in life someone
like his mother, a gay boy exhibits cross gender behaviour to gain the attention
52 Kirkpatrick et al op cit note 43, at 551.
53 C.J Patterson 'Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents' (1992) 63 Child Development 1025, at 1030 and
1031.
54 M.D Zuger 'Homosexuality in Families ofBoys with Early Effeminate Behaviour: An
Epidemiological Study' (1989) 18 Archives ol'Sexual Behaviour 155 at 16355 U, •
Green et al op cit note 47, at 181.
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and favour of the father. 56 Friedman confrrms that cross gender behaviour is
linked to sexual orientation.57
The empirical evidence on the role that the lesbian household plays in respect
of a child's sexual preference, provided no definite answers thus far because
studies have concentrated on children of school going age. Colombok et al
concluded that the children oftheir study were not very young. However, there
seemed to be no atypical behaviour as the majority had heterosexual crushes.58
One gay father said,
"My straight parents failed to make me straight, so there's
no reason to believe I would succeed in doing the reverse
with [my son] even if I wanted to. He will be whatever he
is. Gay or straight is okay as long as he's happy. I'll love
him. Relatives will blame me if he's gay and say, it's a
miracle if he's straight. Either way they will give me no
credit, so I have stopped worrying about it. Therefore, ifhe
is gay, it might bring us even closer, and he would not have
to go through the lonesome struggle I did in accepting
myself. He would be one of few kids who could tell his dad
without fear. That is a big plus".59
56 Friedman op cit note 49, at 158.
57 Friedman op cit note 49, at 159.
58 Colombok et al op clt note 38, at 564.
59 B Miller 'Gay Fathers and their Children' (1979) 28 Family Coordinator, at 547.
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1.4 Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysists have various theories regarding the origins ofhomosexuality.
One theory is the persistent prohibition against heterosexual sexual encounters
or physical intimacy. When it comes to boys, parents are constantly
monitoring activity with girls whilst activity with boys is left uncensored.
Hence, in the flight from women, they turn to men. Some psychoanalysts view
homosexuality as "an impairment ofan individual's inner controls. ,,60
Freud maintains that had it not been for our own inhibitions we would all
become gays and lesbians, incestuous and bisexuals.61 No systematic studies
have been conducted in this area. However, what we have evolves from the
years of clinical experience of psychoanalysts. Psychoanalysis maintains that
most people have cross gender fantasies. However, they do not all agree that
we are all inherently bisexua1.62
According to the Freudian theory, every boy has sexual fantasies, the object of
such being his mother. There is the desire to be rid ofthe father so that the son
can take his place. This instils extreme feelings of guilt and hence these
feelings are repressed. They want to punish themselves by castration. West
maintains that the gay therefore regards any attraction that he may have for the
60 J Marmor Homosexual Behaviour A Modem Reappraisal (1980) 9.
61 West op cit note 30, at 96.
62 Friedman op cit note 5, at 1182.
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opposite sex as being wrong as it brings to the fore his incestuous guilt.63
Friedman maintains that all children irrespective of their sexual predisposition
probably experience the oedipal complex, which has at its focal point
• • 64castratIon anxIety.
According to PaYne et ai, this oedipal conflict is experienced by children of
both the sexes between the ages of three and five years. They prefer or love
the parent of the opposite sex and wish the other parent dead. The child deals
with these fantasies and emerges from the process loving and accepting both
parents. If the parent of the same sex removed himself from the life of the
child, the child would be guilt ridden, as he would feel that he caused the
separation and he would thus have difficulty with the developmental process
in reaching adulthood. A family that is kept intact and which does not go
through the process of divorce helps to resolve this conflict in the child.65
Hence, there is a need for an ongoing relationship with both parents.
According to Kleber et ai, the psychoanalytical theory suggests that a gay or
lesbian parent-child relationship disrupts the oedipal process resulting in
confused gender identity and inappropriate sex-typed behaviour.66
63 West op cit note 30, at 96.
64 Friedman op cit note 5, at 1186.
65 J.D Payne and KL Khallish 'A Behavioural Science and Legal Analysis ofAccess to the Child in the
Post - Separation / Divorce Family' (1981) 13 Ottawa Law Review 215, at 216 and 217.
66 D.J Kleber and RJ Howell 'The Impact of Parental Homosexuality on Child Custody Cases: A
review ofthe literature' (1986) 14 Bulletin ofthe American Academy ofPsychiatry Law 81, at 82.
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When one looks at the family backgrounds of gays or lesbians one usually
finds a dominating seductive mother and a father who plays little or no role. It
is this poor father-son relationship which results in the son forming a close
relationship with his mother which results in later homosexuality.67 Isay lays
down the poor father-son relationship, to anxiety expressed by the gay because
of the attraction that he feels towards his father.68
It is apparent that there is no clear-cut answer as to why one child in the family
chooses a sexual orientation, which differs, from his siblings. If the social
learning theory was credible then homosexuality would not flourish in a
society where heterosexuality is the "norm" or more prevalent. Similarly,
psychoanalysis offers little clarity. It would seem therefore that the origin of
homosexuality is more genetic. Friedman et al concludes that a prenatal
biological effect, which is probably hormonal, influences sexual orientation.69
CONCLUSION
The scientific and the social science research is contradictary, inconclusive and
unconvincing. There seems to be a leaning towards the genetic biological argument
but it is not conclusive for example, the gene sequencing in the Hamer investigation
and the fmgerprinting research by Green and the research of the monozygotic twins,
the hypothesis supported the male gay but not the female. The Social Learning
67 Marmor op cit note 60, at 10.
68 Friedman op cit note 49, at 158.
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Theory is incoherent because most gays and lesbians are raised in heterosexual
families and most homosexual families still produce heterosexual children.
Biological and social research results point to the probability that the construction of
an identity as a gay and lesbian is a complex, multi-faceted process, currently
underdefined and misunderstood. This confusion and incoherence also means that we
cannot look to biological and social research for the 'formula to settle, the child
custody issue, scientific discoveries cannot settle moral dilemmas. We need to look at
the principles of transformation, egalitarianism, pluralism and multi-culturalism. In
other words, we have to look at the kind ofworld we want to live in, to our respect for
the human dignity of marginalised, rogue and outcast identities, and for the non-
exploitative "lifestyles" we will tolerate and respect. This question of whether
homosexuality is genetically or environmentally determined may also be a question,
which is offensive to gays because by asking this question we are inferring that
homosexuality is pathological. After all, do we ask what makes heterosexuals,
heterosexual? The Nature v Nurture debate offers no definite answers and in fact
seems quite pointless, because in defming women's rights one does not look to the
size of the brain, etcetera. Similarly in establishing the protectoral rights of parents to
have custody of their children, an examination of their biological structure does not
offer the solution.
69 Friedman op cit note 5, at 1179.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SOUTH AFRICA LAW CONCERNING CUSTODY AND ACCESS
2.1 Historical Overview
A study of the history of early South African law indicates no reference or
mention of custody or access where the parents are gay and lesbian.
According to Roman-Dutch law the father had custody ofthe children. l Since
the male had dominion over the wife (and her propertY), and over servants, it
was a simple continuation of male privilege that the father would have legal
authority over the child, even if the child care per se was with the mother.
This patriarchal nature of Roman Dutch law has extended into the concept of
homosexuality. It could explain the strong opposition that gays and lesbians
have always experienced.
In the 1937 case of Cook v Cook,2 the court referred to Voet who postulated
that the detennination of the awarding of custody of the child in post divorce
situations was left to the discretion of the judge. However, in exercising this
discretion, the courts would have due regard to the best interests of the child,
as well as the interests of the innocent spouse.3 According to Voet, judges
favoured the innocent spouse, unless it was contrary to the interest of the
child.4
I LD Schafer The Law ofAccess to Children led (1993) 25-26 .
2 1937 AD 154, at 162.
3 Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56.
4 Ibid, at 162.
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In Cook v Cook, the father sought custody on the basis of desertion and
adultery. As far as the adultery was concerned, the court held that it was not
proved that the wife committed adultery and even if it was proved "she did so
in circumstances which excluded all possibility of the moral contamination of
the children".5 The judge added that the innocent spouse rule although
applicable in such cases was not a hard and fast rule and was subject to many
exceptions. He acknowledged that the most important factor was the best
interest of the children.6
Contrary to the innocent spouse rule, Van Leeuwen was of the view that the
court had the discretion to award custody to the father or the mother, and he
considered the mother to be the best choice for the custodian parent.7 In the
1939 case of Calitz v Calitz,8 responding to counsel's citation of Van
Leeuwen, Tindall lA referred to de Haas, who rejected the view of Van
Leeuwen. According to de Haas, Van Leeuwen incorrectly cited Code (5:49)
and Digest (27.2.1) which in effect discussed the position of children who had
lost their father.9 Thereafter the courts have for many years applied the
maternal preference rule or the tender years doctrine. This is where the
custody of girls ofany age and young children are awarded to the mother. The
courts only looked to the father where the mother was found to be morally,
5 Ibi~ at 160.
6 Ibid, at 163.
7 J.G Kotze (1921) Simon Van Leeuwen's Commentaries on Roman Dutch Law 21.
8 1939 AD 56.
9 1939 AD 56, at 60.
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physically or emotionally unfit. 10 Adolescent boys were usually awarded to
the father. ll
2.2 Analysis of Case Law and Legislation
2.2.1 Awards of Custody in Respect of Heterosexual Parents.
In terms of the Guardianship Act,12 both parents have equal guardianship.
Guardianship is the capacity of the parent to administer the estate and to assist
in juristic acts of the child.13 Both parents can act independently and without
consent from the other save for the specified exceptions.14 Upon divorce,
unless the court makes an order to the contrary, both parents retain
d· h' 15gua~ lans lp.
Custody is that part of parental power which relates to the child's daily
personal life. It relates to the day-to-day activities and relates to the child's
health care and to religious and educational activities. 16 Upon divorce the
court as upper guardian of the child, decides which parent is to have soleI?
custody of the child. Where it is in the best interests of the child the court has
also awarded joint custody. This is where the care and control of the child is
shared by both parents and the child would live in both households usually for
10 A Hoffinan and B. K Pincus The Law ojCustody led (1989) 33.
11 P.Q.RBobergLaw o/Persons and the Family 2ed (1999) 536-537.
12 192 of 1993.
13 FJ Bosman G.J van Zyl Children and Young Persons in J.A Robinson Children and Young Persons
led (1997) 53.
14 Section 2 of Guardianship Act 192 of 1993.
15 Boberg op cit note 11, at 505.
16 Bosman and Van Zyl op cit note 13, at 54.
17 This is where one parent is responsible for the day-to-day care ofthe child.
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an equal amount of time. I8 Various criticisms have been levelled against the
award ofjoint custody which includes the issue ofstability and practicality.19
Our courts in recognition of the need for a continuous relationship between the
child and parent have awarded access to the non-custodian parent. Even
where the divorce order is silent on the issue, rights of access are automatic?O
The courts favour "reasonable" access, which would usually be alternate
weekends and alternate school holidays. Parents would usually come to an
arrangement regarding the logistics of access. Where no agreement can be
reached, the court would defme access.2I
The roles of mothers and fathers have been stereotypically divided. This is
evident from King J, in McCall v McCall, when he stated that "the respondent
is a good woman and a good mother. What she offers Rowan is the loving,
nurturing, rearing of a child which is the traditional and natural role of a
mother and the respondent has done it well. I believe, however, that Rowan
has now reached the stage of his development, at the doorstep of puberty,
where his need for discipline of a father is greater than his need for the
protectiveness of a mother. ,,22 However this stereotype seems to be altering
because courts are recognising that fathers are also fulfilling the nurturing
role.23 More recently in Van der Linde v Van der Linde,24 the mother applied
18 Boberg op cit note 11, at 551.
~~ See also Boberg op cit note 11, at 555 and V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), at 179.
Schafer op cit note 1, at 31.
21 Bosman and Van Zyl op cit note 13, at 62.
22 1994 (3) SA 201 (C), at 206 J.
23 Bethel v Bland 1996 (2) SA 194 (W), at 202 J - 203 B.
24 1996 (3) SA 509 (0).
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for custody of her fourteen-year-old son and nine-year-old daughter or
alternatively just for the custody ofher daughter.
It was found that it was in the son's best interest that he remained with his
father. If the 'maternal preference rule' dictated, the mother would have been
awarded custody of the girl. However, the court held that the concept of
"mothering" was a function which either parent could perform and was not
determined by gender.25 The same view was taken in Madiehe v Madiehi
6
where the court said that "custody of a young child is a responsibility as well
as a privilege and it has to be earned. It is not a gender privilege or right." An
application of the 'maternal preference' rule discriminates against men and is
unconstitutional.27 Goldstone J, in President of the Republic ofSouth Africa
and Another v Hug028 accepted the submission that mothers shouldered more
responsibility than fathers in raising children. He also accepted that there were
many instances where the father would be the primary caregiver. He stated
that even though mothers shared an unequal burden in bringing up children, it
would be unfair to discriminate between women and men.29
In a concurring judgment Mokgoro J said, that the motivation for releasing
mothers and not fathers from prison, was because of the nurturing role that
mothers played in child rearing. However, she said that to deny men early
release, "on the basis of stereotypical assumptions concerning men's aptitude
25 Ibid, at 514 1-1-515 B.
26 19972 All SA 153 (B) see also FJ. Bosman and G.J van Zyl in lA Robinson The Law ofChildren
and Young Persons led (1997) 60 and G.E Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of
Rights 1ed (1999) 392.
27 Section 9 ofConstitution 108 of 1996.
28 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).
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at child rearing is an infringement upon their equality and dignity".3o Ex Parte
CritchfieId and Anothe?! was an application for a variation order. At the time
of the application both parents shared joint custody. According to the judge,
"it would not amount to unfair discrimination for a court to have regard to
maternity as a fact in making a determination as to the custody of young.
However, it would amount to unfair discrimination if a court were to place
undue weight upon this factor when balancing it against relevant factors".32
The court found that the father was a more stable parent and stability was an
important factor in awarding custody. The court also found that he had
adequately performed his nurturing role whilst exercising joint custody. It was
therefore in the children's interest that custody be awarded to the father.
In terms of Section 6(1) of the Divorce Act,33 a decree of divorce shall not be
granted unless the court is satisfied, that the provisions made, for the welfare
of the children are satisfactory or are the best that can be effected in the
circumstances.34
In Fletcher v Fletcher,35 the Appellate Division formulated the best interest
rule, which considers the interest of the child as paramount. The best interest
rule has subsequently been fo llowed by the COurtS.36 In exercising the best
29 Ibid, at 727 F.
30 Ibid, at 747 G -748 A.
31 1999 (3) SA 132 (W), at 143 B- C.
32 Ibid at 143 B-C.
33 Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
34 Hoyi V Hoyi 1994 (1) SA 89 E
Zorbas v Zorbas 1987 (3) SA 436, at 439 I-J
Ex Parte Critchfield and Another 1999 (3) SA 132, at 143 H-l
35 1948 (1) SA 130 (A).
36 Fortune v Fortune 1955 (3) SA 348 (A)
Shawzin v Lazifer 1968 (4) SA 657 (A)
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interest rule the court has acted as upper guardian of all children.
37
Unlike
other jurisdictions South Africa does not have legislation that defines or
provides guidelines for the best interest rule.
38
What would be in the best
interests of a particular child in a particular case would obviously depend on
the circumstances of the case. Over the years our courts have given guidelines
as to what is in the best interests ofthe child.
39
In considering what is in the best interests of the child our courts look at the
individual needs of the child. What follows is a determination of the
suitability ofthe parents to fulfil those needs. McCall v McCaZtO provided the
following list of factors which the court ought to consider in custody disputes:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties which exist between parent
and child and the parent's compatability with the child;
Cb) The capabilities, character and temperament of the parent and the impact
thereof on the child's needs and desires;
(c) The ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the parent's
insight into, understanding ofand sensitivity to the child's feelings;
(d) The capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the guidance
which he requires;
(e) The ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the
child, the so-called "creature comforts", such as food, clothing, housing
Van Oudenhove v Gruber 1981 (4) SA 857 (A)
B vS 1995 (3) SA 571 (A).
37 A Cockrell The Law ofPersons and the Bill ofRights in Bill ofRights Compendium led
(1996) 3E-33.
38 K v K 1999 (4) SA 691 (C), at 709 A-B.
39 French v French 1971 (4) SA 198 (W).
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and other material needs - generally speaking, the provision of economic
security;
(t) The ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and
security of the child, both religious and secular;
(g) The ability of the parent to provide for the child's emotional,
psychological, cultural and environmental development;
(h) The mental and physical health and moral fitness ofthe parent;
(i) The stability or otherwise of the child's existing environment, having
regard to the desirability of maintaining the status quo;
G) The desirability or otherwise ofkeeping siblings together;
(k) The child's preference, if the court is satisfied that in the particular
circumstances the child's preference should be taken into consideration;
(1) The desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex
matching, particularly here, whether a boy of 12 ... should be placed in the
custody of his father; and
(m) Any other factor which is relevant to the particular case with which the
court is concerned.
The capabilities, character and temperament of the parents was assessed in Ex
Parte Critchfield and Another.41 The court found that the mother was unstable
and often displayed emotional outbursts and made aggressive, derogatory
remarks against the father and the children. The court found that the father on
40 1994 (3) SA 201 (C).
41 1999 (3) SA 132(W).
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the other hand, was a far more stable parent42 and that he would endeavour to
help the children develop to their optimum.43 On the other hand in McCall v
McCaZt4 the father's temper and dishonesty did not render him an unsuitable
father.45
The ability to provide the child with all the material needs is a factor which is
taken into account in conjunction with all the relevant factors. This factor
would only feature as being decisive if all the other factors are balanced.
46 In
Shawzin v Laufe/7 the mother was awarded custody even though the father
was able to provide a lifestyle ofa higher standard.
The child's cultural and religious environment was an issue in Chamani v
Chamani.48 The mother was a Satsangi and the father was a Jew. The
children had grown up in the Jewish faith. The court was of the view that it
would be in the best interest of the children to grow up as Jews. The mother
undertook that she would ensure that the children would be brought up in the
Jewish faith. The court found that the mother was a committed Satsangi and
concluded that despite the undertaking, the mother's "beliefs and practices
would inevitably impinge themselves on the children".49 Likewise it is a
common perception that the attitudes and lifestyle of the gay and lesbian
42 Ibid, 144 H-l
43 Ibid, at 145.
44 1994 (3) SA 201 (C).
45 See also Martens v Martens 1991 (4) SA 287 (1).
46 Boberg op cit note 11, at 549.
47 1968 (4) SA 657 (A), at 669 B.
48 2 July 1979 WLD 227/79 unreported, quoted in A Hoffinan and B.KPincus, The Law o/Custody led
(1989) 20-23.
49 Ibid, at 106.
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parent would influence children to such an extent that the latter would become
gay or lesbian themselves.50
It is important in a divorce dispute that siblings remain together. A divorce
involves much transition and usually there is an absence of one parent except
when access is being exercised. Although the status quo ought to be
maintained,51 circumstances may dictate a move ofhouse or school. The bond
between siblings might be the only constant factor and would give the children
a sense of security.52 In Van der Linde v Van der Linde53 the mother applied
for custody of her two children, a boy aged fourteen and a 'girl aged nine.
During the trial, the mother conceded that it would be in the best interests of
the boy that he remained with his father. The custody of the daughter was in
issue. The court reaffirmed that siblings should not be separated and a
separation would only be an advantage if the child is being neglected or
maltreated.54
The preferences of older children are taken into account. A reference to
"older" children is a reference to maturity and not age.55 In McCall v
McCall,56 the judge said that the preference of the child would be taken into
account if the child has the "necessary intellectual and emotional maturity"
and is able "to make an informed and inteIligentjudgment".57 This test is very
subjective because the judge has to make an assessment of the maturity of the
50 Van Roayen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
51 McCall v McCall1994 (3) SA 201 (C).
52 Hoffinann and Pincus op cit note 10, at 38.
53 1996 (3) SA 509 (0)
54 Ibid, at 514 B-C and E.
55 Hoffinann and Pincus op cit note 10, at 50.
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child.58 In contrast, in Greenshields v Wyllie59 the court did not attach much
significance to the wishes ofthe twelve and fourteen year old girls.
6o
In its application of the best interest rule, the judge has to rely on a value
system to decide what is good or bad for the child. In many instances there is
little clarity on which values to adopt and the common law rule has been
criticised for having no uniform clear guidelines.61 The court inevitably has to
look at societal values. The factors looked at therefore reflect judicial and
community values and prejudices, and will vary over time, space and culture.
62
It would appear that there is a uniform best interest standard which prevails
but which changes from time to time as societal views and values alter.
63
The judge has a wide discretion in deciding which factors would influence the
interest of the children. This could result in cases with similar facts having
markedly different judgments. The best interest rule is also fraught with
uncertainty because the courts have to make a current decision which would
affect the future ofa child.64
56 1994 (3) SA 201 ( C).
57 Ibid, at 207 H-J.
58 Boberg op cit note 11, at 541. See also French v French 1971 (4) SA 298 (W).
59 1989 (4) SA 898 (w).
60 See also Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280 (A).
61 A Pantazis 'Children's Rights' in Chaskalson, Kertridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz and Woolman
Constitutional Law ofSouth Africa led (1996) 33-1.
62 E Bonthuys 'OfBiological Bonds, New Fathers and the Best Interests of Children' (1997) 4 South
African Journal ofHuman Rights 623.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, at 636.
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2.2.2 Award of Custody and Access in respect of Gay and Lesbian parents.
With the background of how our South African courts view custody and
access by the heterosexual parent, I now seek to delve into the area where the
litigant is a gay or lesbian parent. Considering the "moral and legal climate
predating the transitional constitution",65 it is not surprising that the fIrst case
to come before the South African courts was only the 1994 case of Van
Rooyen v Van Rooyen.66
This was a case in which a lesbian mother sought access to her two children,
aged 11 and 9
l h years. The parties had been divorced for six years during
which time, the mother exercised liberal rights of access. The mother
subsequently formed a lesbian relationship with another woman whom she
moved in with. The latter relationship caused a change in the father's attitude
towards the applicant mother and her rights of access. The mother in an
attempt to defme her rights ofaccess sought relief from the courts. In defming
access, Flemming J stated that it was not the suitability of the mother but her
lesbianism that was in question. The court stated that the views of the
custodian parent were significant and would be taken into account.67 The
court considered the reports of the family counsellor and two psychologists.
The submissions of the family counsellor were dismissed because it dealt with
the "suitability" of the mother and not the "desirability of access".68 The
expert witnesses did not oppose the idea of sleep-over access, however the
65 C Lind 'Sexual Orientation, Family Law and the Transitional Constitution (1995) 112 South African
Law Journal 481, at 488.
66 1994 (2) SA 325 (w).
67 Ibid, at 327 D.
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judge was concerned that the children "may obtain confusing signals,,69 with
regard to sexuality.70 Even in the absence ofthe expert evidence the judge had
formulated his own opinions.
"What the experts say is to me so self-evident that, even without them,
I believe that any right-thinking person would say that it is important
that the children stay away from confusing signals as to how the
sexuality of the male and of the female should develop".71
A constraint was also placed on the mother when she had to choose between
her lifestyle and her children.72 That children should stay away from
"confusing or wrong signals" occupied much of Flemming J's discussion.
73
He stated that children that witness gay and lesbian relationships would be
confused about gender identity. Wrong signals would be connoted if the
applicant and her lesbian partner shared a bed,74 displayed affection or wore
male appare1.75 The lesbian mother was awarded access subject to the
condition that the applicant and partner were not to share a bedroom during the
weekends. In addition, the mother and children were not to "sleep under the
same roof" as the mother's partner during holidays.76 According to Flemming
J, a weekend with the mother's partner being in the same house, although in a
different room, was not so detrimental to the children. He was of the view that
68 Ibid, at 327 G-H
69 Ibid, at 328 C-D.
70 !bid, at 329A.
71 !bid, at 328 1- 329 A
72 Ibid, at 329 F-G.
73 Ibid, 328 C-D, 328 1- 329 A and 329 I - 330 C.
74 !bid, at 329 I-J.
7S Ibid, at 330 B-C.
76 Ibid, at 331 F-H
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the latter is counterbalanced by the children spending the remaining twenty
nine days with their father, under whom they would have proper guidance
regarding "normal sexuality".
The judge acknowledged that the relationship between the mother and children
was in the best interest of the children,77 but nevertheless he limited access by
the lesbian mother. Ironically, the mother had enjoyed access for the five or
six years preceding the trial and the court found that there was no "negative
impact".78 On the one hand, it was stated that the interests of the mother must
be respected but on the other hand, by limiting her rights of access, the judge
was dictating to her as to how she should live.79 One of the conditions of the
court order was that the lesbian mother was ''to take all reasonable steps and
do all things necessary in order to prevent the children from being exposed to
lesbianism or to have access to all videos, photographs, articles and personal
clothing, including male clothing, which may connote homosexuality or
approval of lesbianism.80 According to Bonthuys,81 the judge seemed to be
presuming that the applicant did wear male apparel although there was no
evidence to this effect. There is also a presumption that the children would
have easy access to pornography.82
It is argued by the writer that heterosexuals may also possess pornographic
material. However parents, whether heterosexual or gay, should be cautious to
n Ibid, at 326.
78 Ibid, 328 H
79 Ibid, at 329 G.
80 Ibid, at 332 C-D.
81 Bonthuys op cit note 62.
82 Ibid.
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expose their children to pornography because of the negative effects thereof.
The judge's denial of access to the aforementioned material would be
understandable if it related to pornographic material or if he had any evidence
of it.
The court had ordered that the applicant was not to share a bedroom or "sleep
under the same roof' with her partner.83 Singh84questions whether constraints
placed upon a lesbian mother would really be in the best interests of the child.
She maintains that there is a degree of emotional attachment, which exists
between the lesbian mother and her lover. Enforced deprivation would
negatively affect the mother's emotional stability thus affecting the interests of
the child hence the ricochet effect.
Clark85 submits that the decision in Van Rooyen v van Rooyen86 presumes that
the gay or lesbian parent is unfit and reflects the subjective moral views of
judges, generally.
De VOS87 submits that throughout the judgment, it becomes clear that the judge
regarded homosexuality as "abnormal" and contagious. Hence children should
be protected from exposure to the ills of homosexuality. These conclusions
were unsubstantiated because they were based on assumption rather than
scientific evidence. The judge's opposition and hostility to homosexuality was
83 !bid, at 331 F-H
84 D Singh Discrimination against Lesbians in Family Law' (1995) 2 South African Journal on Human
Rights 571.
85 B Clark 'Competing Custody Rights: New Concepts of ''Family'' and the Best Interests ofthe Child'
(1998) xxxi CILSA 288, at 292.
86 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
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based on societal prejudices. According to Flemming J, his views reflect those
of any "right thinking person".88 De Vos submits that the latter would refer to
"the average heterosexual white male in South Africa". Further, Flemming J's
discrimination of the lesbian mother violates section 8 of the Constitution.
89
It is submitted that we cannot deny custody or access because it runs parallel
to the perceptions of society. The role of the court as upper guardian of
children is to protect the interests of children and not to advance the views of
society.
Mosikatsane90 makes reference to the following statement in Van Rooyen v
Van Rooyen, "the fact is that many people, as least as right thinking as the
applicant, would frown upon the idea of calling the relationship created on the
basis oftwo females a family".91 He submits that the latter statement endorses
the concept of the traditional heterosexual family, with the mother being the
primary caregiver.92 The ratio of the court suggests that a gay or lesbian is
incapable of being a good parent. It is uncertain as to what the belief is
attributed to. It could be the mother's failure to "overcome her homosexuality
or the presence ofthe gay partner could pose as a problem".93
87 P de Vos 'Sexual Orientation Family Law and the Transitional Constitution' (1995) 12 South African
Law Journal 687,690-691.
88 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 328 I - 329 A
89 Ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa of 1993.
90 T.L Mosikatsane 'Gay and Lesbian Adoptions and the Best Interests Standard: A Critical Analytical
Perspective' in R Keightley Children's Rights (1996) 114, at 120.
91 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 326 I-J.
92 Mosikatsane op cit note 90.
93 Mosikatsane op cit note 90, at 129.
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The judge was concerned about the "wrong signals" that the mother's conduct
would send to the children.94 Flemming J was assuming that social factors and
the child's home environment would be responsible for the sexual orientation
. . d· .. I h 95 St 96that a child adopts. ThIs assumptIon contra IctS emplflca researc . eyn
also acknowledges that there seems to be a fear that the children would turn
out to be gays or lesbians but emphasises that there is no scientific evidence to
support such a theory.
Flemming J seemed to have rubber stamped the views of the two
psychologists. Even in the absence of expert evidence the judge had
formulated his own opinions.97 This reeks of subjectivity and bias in the
courtroom, a litigant's greatest fear. The use of the words "right thinking
person" by the learned judge is a reference to the attitude of the heterosexual
and what he considers to be normal. It would seem that majoritarian values
are the norm and any deviation from such is intolerable and labelled as being
confusing. In keeping with the spirit of the Constitution irrespective of ones
own subjective views one needs to be tolerant ofpersons who are different.
A case which followed Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen98 and which was decided
after the Constitution of 1996, was V v V.99 The parties in the latter case had
two children aged twelve and thirteen years. Since their separation they had
shared joint custody. However during divorce proceedings the father claimed
94 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 328 C-D.
95 See chapter 1, at 16-22.
96 E Steyn 'From Closet to Constitution: The South African Gay Family Rights Odyssey' 1998 The
97 Changing Family International Perspectives on the Family and Family Law 405, at 428.
Ibid, at 328 J - 329 A
98 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
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sole custody on the basis of the mother's lesbianism and mental disorder. The
court had to determine the mother's suitability as a parent. The plaintiff
husband was very concerned that the children would be exposed to the lesbian
relationship and objected to the defendant having any contact with her partner
whilst the children were present. IOO The experts called in by both parties did
not regard the mother's sexual orientation as being relevant or of issue.
IOI
However, Foxcroft J stated that this does not mean "that the plaintiff is not
entitled to believe it may present a problem. He is fully entitled to protect his
children against what he perceives to be harmful influences". However, it had
to be established whether those fears were real and sound.
102
The plaintiff also
expressed concern that the defendant was not a fit mother because of her
mental condition. However the judge concluded that it was the mother's
lesbianism and not her mental condition which was the plaintiffs cause of
concern and the basis of his application for sole custody.103 He stated further
that had the latter been an issue ofconcern, the plaintiffwould not have agreed
to the earlier joint custody arrangement. 104 The plaintiff relied on Van Rooyen
v Van Rooyen.105 However, Foxcroft J maintained that it was politically
incorrect to regard homosexuality as being "abnormal" in view of the equality
clause as contained in section 9 of the Constitution.] 06 The court found that
the mother, despite her history of child abuse and a mental condition, was a
strong and capable person and was a good and suitable mother and should
therefore be awarded access. He stated that to limit the mother's visits because
99 1998 (4) SA 169 (C).
100 Ibid, at 181.
101 Ibid, at 182.
102 Ibid, at 182 D-E.
103 Ibid, at 187.
104 Ibid, at 188.
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of her lifestyle would be unfair to her and also to her children. "They would
grow up with the feeling that their mother was being punished, not for
anything which she had done to them, but because of the risk that her lifestyle
might influence them in the wrong direction. What better protection against
that can there be than continuing to live with both parents and judging for
themselves eventually whether the lifestyle of the father or the mother was
more or less harmful than the other".107 The father was deeply angered by his
wife's breach of an earlier agreement because she cohabited with her partner
whilst the children were present in the home. However the court held that the
father's anger did not justify the children being deprived of mothering. The
interest of the children was paramount and the defendant could not be
punished at the expense of the children's interest.108 The relationship between
the parents was far from cordial, considering the accusations the father made
regarding the mother's instability and lesbianism. Notwithstanding, joint
custody was awarded.109
vv V 110 could be hailed by some as a victory for gay parents however I have
some reservations. V v 0 11 has not overruled Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen.112
The court applied the best interest rule by reference to the criteria in McCall v
McCall. l13 The court also acknowledged the mother's right to equality and
that she should not be unfairly discriminated against on the basis ofher sexual
105 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 329 1-330 B.
106 Act 108 of 1996 hereinafter referred to as the Constitution.
107 Ibid, at 192 A-E.
IOS Ibid, at 192.
109 See Schlesbusch v Schlesbusch 1988 (4) SA 548 (E)
Pinion v Pinion 1994 (2) SA 725 (D).
110 1998 (4) SA 169 (C).
III Ibid..
112 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
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orientation.114 The judge accepted that the mother was a capable and fit parent
but went on to state that the mother should not be deprived of a relationship of
her children because of her "lifestyle". To do that would cause the children to
grow up with the belief "that their mother was being punished, not for
anything which she had done to them, but because of the risk that her lifestyle
might influence them in the wrong direction". Despite the expert's report that
the mother's lesbianism did not constitute a moral or a psychological threat to
the children,115 the judge's aforementioned statement suggests a distinction
between parental fitness and a lesbian lifestyle. It would appear that
notwithstanding the Bill of Rights he was still of the view that the mother's
lifestyle would negatively influence the children. The judge suggests that the
mother's lesbianism would cause possible harm, when he states that the
children can decide later in life, as to which lifestyle would cause more harm.
The judge leaves the decision to the children. This is alarming considering the
best interest rule and also that the court is upper guardian ofall children.
In Mohapi v Mohapi116 the mother who had legal custody, applied for the
return ofher daughter. She was living in a lesbian relationship and she alleged
that her daughter had a good relationship with her partner. Although the father
had objected to the mother's sexual orientation, the court held that the latter
was not a factor to be taken into account.
113 1994 (3) SA 201 (C).
114 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), at 189.
115 Ibid, at 182.
116 WLD 1998, unreported. quoted in R Louw 'Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the
Redefining of Family: National Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofHome
Affairs' (2000) 16 South African Journal ofHuman Rights 313, at 315.
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In Greyling v Minister of Welfare and Population Development
1l7
the
applicant had been divorced for three years and had obtained custody of the
minor daughter. The applicant's parents objected to her lesbian relationship
and applied to the court for the child to be removed from their daughter and to
be placed with them. The magistrate removed the child from the mother on
the basis that the child would suffer psychological harm. Section 13 of the
Child Care Act118 authorises the magistrate to cause such removal if the child
is in "need of care". The court overturned the decision of the court a quo and
returned the child to the lesbian mother.
Van Rooyen v Van RooyenJl9 came before the courts once agam. The
daughter, Karen who was now seventeen years old, experienced problems with
her father and expressed a desire to live with her mother. It was discovered
from her diary that she had formed an intimate relationship with her boyfriend.
The father adopted strict disciplinary measures, which included termination of
social as well as extramural school activities. This resulted in the daughter
suffering from depression and the latter impacted negatively on her studies.
The psychologist that the applicant had consulted concluded that Karen was
suffering from emotional abuse. He stated that for Karen to remain with her
father would be contrary to her interests. Bertelsmann J, relied on the criteria
set out in McCall v McCall120 and held that it was in the best interests of the
child that the mother be awarded custody. The outcome ofthe decision would
mean that Karen would be separated from her sibling. However the judge said
117
Case no: 98/8197 - WLD, unreported.
118 74 of 1983.
119 Case no: 2031112000 unreported.
120 1994 (3) SA 201 (C), at 204 J - 205 G.
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that this problem could be resolved by an access arrangement where both the
children could spend time together. The sexual orientation of the mother was
not in issue. When commenting on Flemming l's concern of the children
being exposed to "confusing signals", 121 Bertelsmann 1 stated, that it was
unconstitutional to regard a lesbian relationship as being abnormal. It is
interesting to note that notwithstanding Flemming l's fear of future scars, the
minor had formed a heterosexual relationship.
The father's homosexuality was brought to the attention of the court in Ex
Parte Critchfield and Another.122 The court heard that the father had
homosexual encounters both before and after his marriage. The court
discarded this factor in the custody determination. Willis Al said, "certainly in
a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, these encounters can be viewed in no more serious a light than
conventional adultery."123 The latter would be a concern if it threatened the
welfare of the children. 124 The judge found that there was no "risk of the $0-
called confusing signals"125 that was referred to in Van Rooyen v Van
Rooyenl26 The judge linked a gay and lesbian lifestyle to adultery. The latter
constitutes a breach of trust and is viewed by many as immoral. The judge's
comments suggest that he is still labouring under the perception that a gay and
lesbian lifestyle may expose children to "confusing signals". This judgment
reflects that not much has changed since the Van Rooyen case.127
121 Ibid, at 328 I - 329 A.
122 1999 (3) SA 132 (W), at 139 B-C.
123 Ibid, at 139 E.
124 Ibid.
125 1999 (3) SA 132 (W), at 139 F.
126 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 328 D.
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Although the judges are compelled by the Constitution to recognise the rights
of gays and lesbians128 their remarks reflect prejudice and homophobic
attitudes. "The fact that a particular judge would choose to raise her own
children with a different set of moral beliefs, or that the judge does not
approve ofa parent's moral beliefs should not constitute harm to a child".129
The courts need only to consider the sexual conduct of the gay or lesbian
parent in so far as they prejudice the interest of the children. Clark maintains
that any sexual conduct that is harmful to a child, be it of a homosexual or a
heterosexual parent must be taken into account. She distinguished between
intimate and affectionate conduct indicating that the latter would educate the
child concerning relationships whilst the former might prove to be harmful.
Unlike Flemming J in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,130 Clark submitted that there
was no substantiated evidence, that affection displayed between lesbians
would cause harm. Another factor to be taken into account is the character of
the third party with whom the parent has informed a relationship. Character
traits which would adversely affect the child, may be taken into account, for
example drug addiction, but not characteristics such as race, religion or sexual
. . 131 A d' Cl k132 h h .onentatlon. ccor mg to ar t e court s ould rely on conclUSIve
evidence that harm has been caused. There must be proof of immediate,
defmite, defmed harm and not harm which is described in general terms and
based on speculation. Because of misconceptions about what harms children,
127 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
128 Section 9 ofConstitution 108 of 1996.
129 Clark op cit note 85, at 305.
130 1994 (2) SA 325 (w).
131 Clark op cit note 85, at 303.
132 Clarke op cit note 85,at 304.
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gay and lesbian parents have often been placed in the precarious position of
balancing what their children need against what society and the courts would
allow.
The underlying concerns and deep - seated fears expressed for the children of
homosexual parents vary. They are as follows:
i) Homosexuality is a mental illness and children should be kept away
from gays and lesbians
For many years homosexuality has been equated with mental illness and
mental instability.133 This perception had been held, not only in America but
also throughout the western world. This perception had a dramatic effect on
custody cases, which involved gay and lesbian parents because it was for the
benefit and interests of the child if they steered clear from a group ofmentally
unstable parents134.
However, in 1980 the American Psychiatric Association removed
homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses.135 Notwithstanding the
removal of the latter from the list of mental illnesses, some courts have been
slow to accept the information.
133 S Susoeff 'Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Towards a
Rational Custody Standard' (1985) 32 University o/California, Los Angeles Law Review 852,
at 877.
134 Ibid.
135 R Green 'The Best Interests ofthe Child with a Lesbian Mother' (1982) 10 (1) Bulletin 0/American
Psychiatry and the Law 715.
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ii) Sexual Molestation of Children
No studies have been undertaken in South Africa regarding sexual molestation
ofchildren by gay and lesbian parents.
In re J.S and C, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed the fear that gay
fathers who obtained custody would molest their sons especially those fathers
who have younger sons.136 In re Appeal Prima County, Juvenile Action, the
court was so bold as to ask a bisexual man, who was applying for the adoption
of a child, whether he would molest the child or convert him to
h 1· 137omosexua lty.
In the case ofJ.L.P. (H) v D.J.p. 138 the court did not grant stay over access to
the gay father for fear of the child being molested. Lesbians are also targeted
for being molesters, even though women commit only 3% of child
molestation.139 In NKM v L.E.M, a ten- year- old gifl was removed from the
custody of her mother and she was placed with her father. The court
rationalized this, by highlighting the child's fondness and close relationship
with the mother's lover, which the court linked to child molestation.140
According to the empirical evidence, there is a greater possibility that
heterosexuals as opposed to gays and lesbians would molest children.141
Wishard maintains that sexual molestation cases where the perpetrator was a
gay or lesbian, are few and far between and certainly not sufficient to conclude
136 129 N.J.Super.489,324A.2d 90 (Law.Dix.1974), aff' d, 142 N.J. Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54
(App.Div).
137 B-I0489, 15' Ariz.335,727 P.sd 830 (1986).
138 643 S.W. 2D 865 (MO.Ct.App.1982).
:: H Curry and A Clifford A Legal Guide for Lesbians & Gay Couples 3rd ed (1985) 131 .
606 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (M.o. et. App. 1980).
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that gays and lesbians are child molesters. He submits that it is a myth that
homosexuality is created when a "young man is seduced by an older man.,,142
Molestation can be committed by women and men but is more often
committed by men than women. The man could be heterosexual or gay,
however, evidence indicates the former. According to Curry and Clifford,
97% of child molesters are heterosexual males and 870/0 of the victims are
females. 143
In 1961 a study indicated that child molestation was more prevalent among
heterosexuals. According to a 1978 survey of clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists over a period of 300 years in practice, there was not even a single
incident of child molestation where the perpetrator was gay.144 As far as the
child is concerned, the perpetrator makes no distinction in relation to the
gender of the child. 145
From the evidence above it would appear that there is also no correlation
between child molestation and homosexuality.
ii) Teasing, Taunting and Harassment ofChildren
141 D.R Wishard 'Out ofthe Closet and into the Courts: Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody' (1989)
93 Dickinson Law Review 401, at 411.
142 Ibid.
143 Cuny and Clifford op cit note 139, at 131.
144 Suseoff op cit note 133, at 881.
145 P Patterson and M.B King 'Homosexuality and Parenthood' (1991) 303 British Medical Journal 295,
at 296.
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In V V p46 the issue of teasing, taunting and harassment ofthe children
by their peers was raised. The court held that the children were
comfortable with their mother's lifestyle and this was reflected by the
children inviting their friends for sleepovers whilst both the mother and
partner were present in the house.
Lind advises that a greater acceptance of gays and lesbians would
prevent ridicule by society. He adds that "prejudice itself cannot be an
acceptable basis for pursuing discrimination of this kind". 147 The courts
cannot ignore the possibility that the child will be harassed by his peers
and society generally. It must be questioned whether social stigma is
sufficient to deny custody or access? This aspect was fITst argued in
Palmore v Sidoti,148 where a decision of the trial court placed custody
of the child with the white father. The mother had since married a
black man and the trial court feared that the presence of a black
stepfather would cause the child to be teased. The United States
Supreme Court recognized that by denying custody it would be
condoning or even promoting society's prejudices and biases. It was
very succinctly put by the court " ....the Constitution cannot control
prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot directly or indirectly
give them effect.,,149
146 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), at 190.
147 Lind op cit note 65, at 498.
148 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
149 Ibid, at 433.
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The court in MA.B v R.B,150 followed the decision of Pa/more v Sidoti. 151 In
casu, the court acknowledged that there would be adverse criticisms and social
pressures, which the boy would face. Notwithstanding, the court held that
. d Id h' I . 152denymg custo y wou not remove t ese SOCla pressures m any way.
In MP v s.p, the New Jersey Court took a similar view in awarding custody
and held that harassment would be present and would not simply disappear if
custody were denied to the gay and lesbian parent. The court went so far as to
say that teasing, taunting and harassment was good for a child and would
assist and equip the latter in dealing with society and in the formation ofhis or
her own perceptions. 153 That the child would be subjected to jeering and
taunts by his peers and by society generally is real and must be faced up to.
Firstly, there is a need to look at the extent of social harassment. Secondly,
the courts have to examine the harm that such harassment causes to the child.
Finally, before denying custody the court must be satisfied that such denial
will eliminate the harassment.
iii) That the Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents would also become
Homosexual
There is no empiral study that substantiates this notion. 154
ISO 134 Misc. 2d 317, 324, 510 N.Y.S. 2d 960, 963 - 64 (1986).
151 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
152 MA. B. vR B, at 323.
153 169 N.J. Super. 425, at 436-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 --63 (App. Div 1979).
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2.3 Sexual Orientation and the Constitution
Sexual Orientation of the Gay and Lesbian Parent
There are various sections of the Constitution which are relevant to and which
guarantee the rights of gay and lesbian parents. Section 7 of the Bill of Rights
reaffirms South Africa's commitment to equality and democracy. Section 7
(l) reads, 11 this Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom ".155
2.3.1 Section 9
The equality clause contained in the Bill of Rights is a core provision of the
Constitution.156
Section 9 stipulates:
(1) "Everyone is equal before the law and has
the right to equal protection and benefit of
the law.
154 See Chapter 1, at 16-22.
155 Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
156 G Carpenter 'Motifs inscribed on our Social Fabric: Equality in Brink v Kitshoff (1997) 13 South
African Journal ofHuman Rights 304, National Coalition ofGay and Lesbian Equality v Minister
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(2) Equality includes the full and equal
enjoyment
of all rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may
be taken
(3) The State may not unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and
birth
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds in terms of
subsection (3). National legislation must
ofHome Affairs 2000 (2) SA l(CC), at 34 E.
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be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair
discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the
grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair
unless it IS established that the
discrimination is fair."
The phrase "equal benefit" of the law was obtained from the Canadian Charter
of Rights 157. However, persons in different circumstances might require
different treatment. Sometimes the needs and interests ofa certain category of
persons demand different treatment.158 According to the Aristotelian model
equals must be treated equally and unequals, unequally. The question posed
by Cachalia is, who are the equals?159 The Canadian courts have used the
similarly situated test.160 This test is not watertight because in Andrew v Law
Society of British Columbia/61 the court said there was no criteria for
determining who was similarly situated and who was not. In President ofthe
Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo,162 the court said "we need
therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the
basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by
157 Schedule B to the Constitution Act of 1982, Part ~ Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms
hereinafter referred to as Canadian Charter ofRights or the Charter.
158 M Chaskalson, J Kentridge, J Klaaren, G Marcus, D Spitz and S Woolrnan Constitutional Law of
South Africa 1ed (1996) 14 - 3.
159 A Cachalia, H Cheadle, D Davis, N Haysom, P Maduna and G Marcus Fundamental Rights in the
New Constitution Juta, Cape Town led (1994) 26.
160 Ibid.
161 1989 56 DLR (4th) 1, at 11-13.
162 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708; at para 41.
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insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is
achieved. Each case therefore, will require a careful and thorough
understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular
people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers
the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in
one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context." The law
cannot accord equal rights to gays and lesbians because to do that would
ignore the differences and would result in inequality. Currently gays and
lesbians are excluded from marriage. In order for gays and lesbians to have
equal benefit and protection of the law there has to sometimes be a different
set of rules to achieve equality. To recognise the union of members of the
same sex there has to be an application of different rules to that which is
applicable to heterosexuals. Yet it would resuIt in equal treatment.163 It is
submitted that the sanctioning of same-sex unions would result in positive
attitudes towards gay parenting.
The provisions of section 9(2) applicable to disadvantaged groups justify
different treatment to remedy past discrimination.
According to Devenish 164 a person claiming that his right to equality has been
violated must prove the following:
1) that the applicant has been treated differently;
163 Lind op cit note 65, at 494.
164 G. E Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill o/Rights led (1999) 42.
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2) that there is no rational connection between the means and the objective.
Devenish further argues that if the section 9 (1) enquiry fails, the applicant
must prove "unfair discrimination". To show unfair discrimination, the
applicant must prove that:
1) he has been treated differently;
2) he has been differentiated against based on one ofthe grounds as
enumerated by section 9 (3)165
Harksen v Lane NO and Others/66 is a good illustration of how an applicant
can challenge laws with an equality based approach. The applicant in this
matter was Mrs Harksen, who was married out of community of property to
Mr Harksen. In terms of section 21 (1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 "The
additional effect of the sequestration of the separate estate of one of two
spouses who are not living apart under a judicial order of separation shall be to
vest in the Master, until a trustee has been appointed, and, upon the
appointment of a trustee, to vest in him all the property of the spouse whose
estate has not been sequestrated as if it were property of the sequestrated
estate, and to empower the master or trustee to deal with such property
d· I ,,167 B· f h ~ . d . haccor mg y ... y vIrtue 0 t e alorementlOne sectIon, t e property of
Mrs Harksen was attached. Mrs Harksen referred to section 28 of the interim
165 Ibid, at 42 and 43.
166 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).
167 Ibid, at 309 B.
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Constitution,168 which referred to property rights and in particular to section
28 (3). In terms of section 28 (3) any property expropriated in terms of any
law must be duly compensated for. Mrs Harksen alleged that she did not
receive such compensation. The purpose of section 21 was to ensure that
property which belonged to the insolvent remained in the estate.169 Goldstore
J held that the effect of section 21 could not be regarded as an expropriation.
170
Hence section 21 did not contravene section 28 (3) ofthe Constitution.
The applicant also contended that section 21 was in contravention of the
equality clause. In developing the equality jurisprudence171 the court set out
the following test which is followed by the courtS. I72 The frrst stage of the
enquiry is whether the impugned provision differentiates between people or
categories of people. If it is answered in the affrrmative, the second stage of
the enquiry is that there must be a rational connection between the
differentiation and the legitimate governmental purpose which the
differentiation seeks to achieve.
If the differentiation does not constitute a violation of section 8 (1) it may still
constitute a contravention of section 8 (2), if it amounts to unfair
discrimination.
168 200 of 1993 hereinafter referred to as the interim Constitution.
169 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), at 318 E.
170 Ibid, at 318 F.
171 ''The equality jurisprudence and analysis developed by the court in relation to section 8 of the
interim Constitution is applicable equally to section 9 ofthe 1996 Constitution notwithstanding
certain differences in the wording ofthese provisions".
I72 National Coalitionfor Gay andLesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
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If the second stage of the enquIry for section 8 (1) is answered in the
affirmative, that is, if there is a rational connection to a legitimate
governmental purpose, it becomes necessary to conduct an enquiry in terms of
section 8 (2). This step is necessary to establish that irrespective of the
existing legitimate governmental purpose, the differentiation amounts to unfair
discrimination.173
Section 8 (2) also has a two stage enquiry namely; whether the differentiation
amounts to discrimination. Secondly, if answered in the affmnative whether
the discrimination is unfair. 174 If the discrimination relates to a specified
ground, unfairness is presumed. If the discrimination relates to an unspecified
ground, unfairness must be established before a breach of section 8 (2) is
proved.
The court in the Harksen case,175 heId that section 21 differentiated between
the solvent spouse of an insolvent estate and creditors or persons who have
had business dealings with the insolvent. However Goldstone J stated, that
there was a rational connection between the differentiation and the legitimate
governmental purpose. The object of section 21 was to assist the trustee to
determine which property belonged to the insolvent estate and to prevent
collusion to the detriment of creditors.176 The court concluded that section 21
did not violate section 8 (1). The provisions of section 21 discriminated
173 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), at 321 D-E.
174 Ibid, at 321 E-F.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid, at 325.
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against the solvent spouse of an insolvent, however it did not constitute unfair
discrimination.
The case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Justice l77 is an example of the frrst application of the test contained in section
9 of the 1996 Constitution. An application was made to confrrm the
constitutional invalidity of section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act178 and the
inclusion of sodomy as an item in two other statutes. 179 The High Court had
also declared the common law crime of sodomy and the commission of an
unnatural sexual offence to be unconstitutional. 18o Section 20A181 prohibited
any conduct which "stimulates sexual passion or gives sexual gratification,,182.
Ackermann J in displaying his total disapproval of the section gives the
following example, if a gay couple in an expression of love share a passionate
kiss, they would be guilty of an offence. A similar display of affection by a
lesbian or heterosexual couple would be disregarded by the law. This is
discriminatory and sexual orientation being a specified ground, is presumed to
be unfair. Although the constitutional validity of the common law offence of
sodomy was not before the court, it was found that the latter was incidental to
the question of its inclusion to Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act and
to the Schedule to the Security Officers Act. 183 The court held that the
common law crime of sodomy was constitutionally invalid in its entirety. The
177 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
178 0 f1957.
179 Schedule 1 ofthe Criminal Procedure Act, 1977,
Schedule to the Security Officers Act, 1987.
180 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W).
181 OfSexual Offences Act, 1957.




inclusion of the common-law offence of sodomy in the aforementioned
statutes184 was held to be inconsistent with the provisions ofthe Constitution.
Section 9 (3) makes reference to direct and indirect discrimination. Both types
of discrimination are proscribed by section 9 (3). Direct discrimination is
when a person is discriminated against because of some characteristic or
because ofa characteristic attached to a certain groUp.185 An example ofdirect
discrimination would be that gay and lesbian parents, were to be denied
custody of their children.
Indirect discrimination is when a neutral law, like one covermg the
requirements of a civil marriage, is applied to all persons and it has
consequences on a group of persons which are discriminatory.186 Marriage in
South African law is currently a union between "one man and one woman" to
the exclusion while it lasts of all others.187 The institution of marriage
applicable to all citizens, excludes gays and lesbians because the latter form
unions with members oftheir own sex.
Marital status was not included in the interim Constitution but was specifically
alluded to in section 9 (3). We live in a society where heterosexuality is the
norm. Marriage is a "legally recognised voluntary union for life in common of
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others while it lasts.188 This
defmition bars the gay and lesbian from marriage. South Africa has a diverse
184 Of 1987.
185 Schedule 1 ofthe Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.
Schedule to the Security Officers Act, 1987.
186 D Davis, H Cheadle and N Hayson Fundamental Rights in the Constitution led (1997) 55.
187 H. R Hahlo The South African Law ofHusband and Wife 200 (1963) 31.
188 J. D Sinclair The Law ofMarriage (1996) 305.
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multi-cultural society and boasts a kaleidoscope of people. A narrow
defmition of marriage would not survive the current political climate. "The
traditional legal defmition has become outmoded and unacceptable to a large
proportion of the population". 189 In Dawood and Another, Shalabi, Thomas v
Minister of Home Affairs,190 the court in emphasizing the importance of
marriage and the family unit stated" ... we must take care not to entrench
particular forms of family at the expense of other forms".191 The case of
Langemaat v Minister ofSafety and Security,192 was one which dealt with a
contravention with section 9 (3). The applicant a woman, a member of the
South African Police, had been living in a relationship with M, also a woman.
Although not legally allowed to marry, they conducted their relationship as if
it were a marriage. They owned a house and operated their fmances jointly.
Miss Langemaat applied to Polmed to register her partner as a dependant of
the medical aid scheme. The application was refused. The applicant sought
relief from the High Court. The issue before the court was whether the nature
of the relationship between the applicant and M created a legal duty to
maintain each other. 193 In terms of Regulation 30 (2) (b) ofthe South African
Police Service Regulations, a dependant is "the legal spouse or widow or
widower or a dependant child". The applicant's partner was excluded from this
defmition. The applicant contended that this exclusion was a contravention of
section 9 (3) of the Constitution. Roux J, after an analysis of the Roman-
Dutch law, concluded that a duty of support existed between gay and lesbian
189 Ibid.
190 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC).
191 Ibid, at 859 (B).
192 1998 (3) SA 312 (T).
193 Ibid, at 315 G-H
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couples.194 The respondents on the other hand based their argument on section
36. They feared that if the court granted the application it would create a
precedent for other unmarried persons. The court dismissed this argument and
stated that a new precedent for unmarried persons would not necessarily be set
because each application would be decided on its merit. 195 The Langemaat
decision is hailed as a progressive decision which entrenched gay and lesbian
rights. The judge acknowledged that gay and lesbian relationships were stable
and were no different from heterosexual marriages.196 At the same time, the
court's analysis of the law in arriving at its conclusion is poor and incorrect.
The court did not deal adequately with the challenged constitutional
provisions. According to LoUW,197 the judge based his case on Roman-Dutch
law instead of the Constitution.198 The applicant relied on the specified
grounds as enumerated in section 9(3). In this regard the court ought to have
directed itself to Harksen v Lane N0199 in which a detailed enquiry was set
out. Instead the court chose to ignore the challenged constitutional provision.
The Regulation200 did differentiate between married and unmarried persons. It
also discriminated between opposite-sex married couples and same-sex
couples. The next stage of the enquiry is whether there is a rational
connection between differentiation and the legitimate governmental purpose.
According to Louw, in establishing whether there is a legitimate governmental
purpose, one of the reasons that can be advocated is that of a fmancial
194 !bid, at 314 E.
195 Ibid, at 316 H-l
196 Ibid, at 317 D-F.
197 R Louw 'Langemaat v Minister ofSafety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (1) : A Gay and Lesbian
VictOlY but a Constitutional Travesty' (1995) 15 South African Journal ofHuman Rights 393, at
399.
198 Ibid, at 316 F-G.
199 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).
200 30 (2) (b) ofthe South African Police Service Regulations.
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consideration. However he maintains that "for the fiscal constraint argument
to succeed", there must be clear evidence on the financial impact that Polmed
would suffer if the membership were to be extended?Ol Louw also questions
the rationality of the exclusion to particular groups only. Although customary
marriages were not recognised until 1998, the fIfst spouse and children were
admitted as dependants to the Scheme?02 If the court fmds that there was a
rational connection between the differentiation and the legitimate
governmental purpose, it could still amount to unfair discrimination if it
contravenes section 9 (3). The enquiry is whether the discrimination was
unfair. In President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa v Hugo/03 the court stated
that in determining whether the discrimination was unfair "it is necessary to
look not only at the group who has been disadvantaged but at the nature of the
power in terms ofwhich the discrimination was effected and, also at the nature
of the interests which have been affected by the discrimination".204 The court
in the Langemaat case205 ignored all these stages of the enquiry and focussed
instead on Roman Dutch law. The decision is progressive in that it advances
gay rights but lacks sound constitutional analysis.
Another case which dealt with the defmition of family and marriage is that of
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home
Affairs.
206
The applicants in this matter were gays and lesbians who had
entered into "same-sex life partnerships". The applicants argued that their
201 Louw op cit note 197, at 399.
202 Ibid.
203 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC).
204 Ibid, at para 43.
205 1998 (3) SA 312 (T).
206 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
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relationships were not recognised by the Aliens Control Act.
207
In terms of the
Act, Home Affairs could facilitate the immigration of spouses of permanent
South African residents. Gays and lesbians were not allowed to marry hence
gay and lesbian foreign nationals that had entered into permanent relationships
with South African citizens could not obtain temporary or permanent
residence permits. The court had to decide whether the defmition of spouse in
the Aliens Control Acro8 extended to the gay or lesbian partner in a permanent
same-sex union.
In defining family, the courts looked at the ability of the parents to
procreate.2°9 The court examined the various reasons why parents do not have
children or choose to adopt. Sometimes spouses are unable to procreate, have
no interest in sexual relations or choose to remain childless. The judge stated
that the latter couples cannot be excluded from the defmition offamily. To do
so would be demeaning to the parties especially in the case where the inability
to procreate is beyond their control.210 The court concluded that the ability to
procreate was not a defming characteristic of marital relationships.211 The
court stated further that ''homosexuals are capable of constituting a family,
whether nuclear or extended, and of establiship, enjoying and benefiting from
family life which is not distinguishable in any significant respect from that of
heterosexual spouses". The respondent argued that the object of the state was
the protection ofthe traditional institution ofmarriage.212 The court found that
207 96 of 1991.
208 Ibid.
209 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), at 31 E.
210 Ibid, at 32 A-B.
2ll Ibid, at 31 G.
212 Ibid, at 33.
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there was no rational connection between the extending of benefits contained
in section 25 (5)213 and the protection of the institution of marriage. Court
accordingly held that section 25 (5i 14 amounted to unfair discrimination and
was unconstitutional.
In National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home
A.f!airs,215 the court acknowledged that gays and lesbians constituted a family
notwithstanding the fact that the institution of marriage was not available to
them. Louw disapproves of the manner in which the court dealt with the issue
of gay marriages. The court avoided dealing with the status of same-sex
relationships. Louw also warns against the usage of the term "permanent
same-sex life partnership". Some may regard this recognition of gay
relationships as being progressive, but Louw cautions against its far reaching
consequences. The introduction of such a term connotes that same-sex
relationships although sanctioned, are different from other legal marriages and
runs parallel to them.216
2.3.2 Section 10
Section 10 provides:
"Everyone has inherent dignity and the
right to have their dignity respected and
protected"
213 Ofthe Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991.
214 Ibid.
215 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) , at 35 E-G.
216 R Louw 'Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the Redefining ofFamily : National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofHome Affairs' (2000) 16 South African Journal of
Human Rights 313, at 320-322.
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South Africa has a history of discrimination not only on the basis of race but
also on the basis of gender and sex. The majority of South African citizens
"were treated as not having inherent worth, as objects whose identities could
be arbitrarily defmed by those in power rather than as persons of infmite
worth. In short, they were denied recognition of their inherent dignity. ,,217
Section 10 may be interpreted as providing gays and lesbians with the right to
be treated with human dignity in child custody disputes. This section also
gives the gay or lesbian the concomitant right not to be stigmatized and
excluded from their dignity as parents because of their sexual orientation. In
Dawood and Another, Shalabi and Another, Thomas and Another v Minister
ofHome Affairs and Others,218 the court said that in view of South Africa's
apartheid history the concept of dignity is of core value and is entrenched in
the Constitution.219 Various applicants sought immigration permits. In all of
these cases, one of the spouses was a South African citizen. The applicants
applied to the High court to have various provisions of the Alien's Control
Acr20 declared unconstitutional because they were inconsistent with the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.221 "The decision to enter into a
marriage relationship and to sustain such a relationship is a matter of defming
significance for many if not most people and to prohibit the establishment of
such a relationship impairs the ability of the individual to achieve personal
217 Prinsloov Van de Linde and Another 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (cc).
218 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (cc).
219 860 E-F.
220 Alien's Control Act 96 of 1991.
221 Act 108 of 1996.
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fulfillment in an aspect of life that is of central significance,,?22 According to
the court in Dawood, any legislation which prohibits a marriage relationship or
which prevents the spouses from honouring their obligations to each other is
an infringement of the right to dignity.223 The effect of section 25 (9) (b) was
that the spouses would not be able to cohabit or honour their obligations to
each other or their children. The applicants argued that their right to dignity
had been violated. They argued further that "the right of children to family or
parental care" contained in section 28 of the Constitution was violated.224 The
South African Constitution does not expressly protect the right to family life.
However the rights are protected by various Human Rights law.225 The court
declared that section 25 (9) (b) violated the rights ofdignity of foreign spouses
who were married to South African citizens.
In S v Makwanyane and Another226 it was stated that "the rights to life and
dignity are the most important of all human rights ... By committing
ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are
required to value, these two rights above all others".227 The court
acknowledged that when a prisoner goes to prison his or her right to dignity is
to a certain extent impaired. However, the right to dignity is maintained and
not lost altogether.228
222 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC), at 861 E-F.
223 Ibid, at 861 F-G.
224 Ibid, at 856 G-H
225 Article 16 ofthe Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights,
Article 23 of the rntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
226 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
227 Ibid, at 451 C-D.
228 Ibid, at 450 F.
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In National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice, the
court stated that the rights of dignity and equality are closely related.
Although the applicants challenged the crime of sodomy on the basis of
equality, Ackennann J advocated that it was also a violation of section 10 of
the Constitution. Sodomy was a criminal stigma which associated gay men
with common criminals and "degraded and devalued" them and was a
violation oftheir dignity.229
The concept of dignity is linked to unfair discrimination. Discrimination was
prohibited by the Constitution so as to protect the dignity of all citizens.23o In
Hugo's case, the Presidential Act was passed in which mothers of children
under twelve, received a remission of sentence and early release from prison.
The court stated that this Acr31 did not bar male prisoners from individually
applying for State pardons. The court acknowledged that the Acr32 afforded
certain privileges to mothers, that were denied to fathers but concluded that the
dignity of the fathers was not impinged on.
There is another facet to the concept of dignity. In order for one to maintain
his or her dignity there must be freedom ofchoice. Every individual has a will
and in order to fully develop as human beings they need to exercise that will,
without fear of being hindered. Freedom is inseperably linked to dignity.233
According to Ackennann J, in Ferreira's case the court said, "our society
must be one where persons are free to develop their personalities and skill, to
229 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), at 29.
230 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), at 729 A-B.
231 Presidential Act 17 of 1994.
232 Ibid.
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seek out their own ultimate fulfillment, to fulfil their own humanness and to
question all received wisdom without limitations placed on them by the
State".234 It is submitted that the gay and lesbian parents' rights to dignity
ensures that they have the freedom of choice in the lifestyle that they choose
and at the same time may enjoy all the benefits of parenthood.
2.3.3 Section 14
Section 14 stipulates:
"Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have -
(a) their person or home searched;
(b) their property searched;
(c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed."
Although not explicitly stated, the right to privacy includes the right to sexual
privacy between consenting adults, the right to lifestyle privacy and the right
to family privacy. In the case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen, 235 Flemming J
ordered, that when the mother had access to the children on weekends, she was
not to share a bedroom with her lover, and when she had access to them for the
school holidays she was not to "sleep under the same roof' as her lover.236 In
making this order the judge crossed the barrier of privacy and delved into the
domestic realm. Such an intrusion violates one's right to privacy. According
233 Ferreira 1996 (1) SA 1984 (CC), 1996 (1) BCLR 1 para 47-49.
234 Ibid, at 29 C-D.
235 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
236 Ibid, at 331 G - H.
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to Cameron, this argument for respect of privacy has another leg, it
presupposes that homosexuality is disgusting and improper and should only be
accepted if it is left to the confmes of one's room?3? According to LoUW,238
Katz's analysis of Cameron is that the latter is incorrect in his submission
because all sexual activity is kept out ofthe public arena and no individual has
obtained rights to engage in sexual activity in public.
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,
Ackermann J said that one should note the context in which Cameron made
those remarks. It was made at a time just before the inception of the
Constitution. Cameron was strategising on ways in which the rights of the
gays and lesbians ought to be protected. Cameron was in favour of sexual
orientation being enumerated as a ground for non -discrimination. He did not
believe that the privacy argument on its own would suffice as protection of
gay and lesbians.
An individual has a certain degree of autonomy with regard to his or her own
identity and family life. When the individual steps out of his personal
boundary into the business and social sphere, this autonomy decreases?39
Sexual preference and intimacy is protected by the right to privacy. If adults
consensually engage in sexual relations, any external interference with that
relationship would violate the constitutional right to privacy?40 The court in
237 E Cameron 'Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights' (1993) 110
South African Law Journal 450, at 453.
238 R Louw 'Sexual Orientation, Criminal Law and the Constitution: Privacy versus Equality' (1998) 11
South African Journal o/Criminal Justice 375, at 383.
239 Bernstein. v Bester 1996 (2) SA 571 (CC).
240 National Coalition o/Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 0/Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), at 30
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National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice ill
considering the constitutionality of inter alia the inclusion of sodomy in
various statutes did not only examine the discrimination based on the right to
equality but also on the right to privacy.
LOU~41 submits that Katz is incorrect in his interpretation, in that Cameron
regards sexual orientation as encompassing much more than sexual relations
and that it impacts on various issues such as emplOYment and family
relationships. Louw advocates that privacy includes the concept of identity.
This suggests that a gay or lesbian has a right to his or her identity, an identity,
which is not only to be tolerated but also to be accepted, and a right, which the
state cannot interfere with. Notwithstanding Louw, in making reference to
South African242 as well as foreign case la~43 concludes that a privacy-based
approach was weak and not adequate to challenge the laws.244
2.3.4 Section 15
Section 15 stipulates:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of
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On the basis of the aforementioned section a gay or lesbian is entitled to his or
her belief in the lifestyle that has been adopted as well as to the participation in
the identity or cultural group of gays and lesbians.
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister ofJustice/45
the court had to consider the constitutional validity of section 20A of the
Sexual Offences Act of 1957 and the inclusion of sodomy in certain
statutes.246 Sexual relationships between males were disapproved of by the
majority of society because ofreligious beliefs and because some believed that
sexual intercourse should only be engaged in for the purpose of procreation.
Even though the objectives might be sincere the court drew attention to the
fact that freedom of religion, belief and opinion were protected by the
Constitution.247
The heterosexual parent may disapprove of the other parent's homosexuality
and may also object to the children having any contact with such gay parent.
The disapproval might be on religious grounds and he therefore would not
want the children exposed to homosexuality. The gay or lesbian parent has
recourse to the courts on the basis of section 15 like the applicants in Christian
Education SA v Minister ofEducation.248
In the latter case, the applicants challenged the abolition of corporal
punishment in schools, which they believed was a tenet of Christian religion.
245 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), at 32 B-E.
246 Schedule 1 ofthe Criminal Procedure Act, 1977
Schedule to the Security Officers Act, 1987.
247 1999 (9) BCLR 951(SE).
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Hence the abolition violated the rights of Christian parents in terms of the
Constitution. The court enquired as to whether corporal punishment did form
part of the Christian religion and if it did, the sincerity of the person in that
belief. The court found that the applicants did not have a sincere belief that
children in schools should receive corporal punishment. The applicants did
not approve of girls in secondary schools receiving corporal discipline and
acknowledged that there were other methods ofchastisement. 249
On the other hand the gay or lesbian parent may argue that he does not ascribe
to these religious beliefs and that on the basis of section 15 he also has a right
to freedom of religion. Such a parent might be an atheist or agnostic. In
Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, 250
the court said that atheism was the very antithesis of religion and therefore one
could not claim a right to freedom of religion on that basis. "Freedom of
religion did not mean freedom from religion." However the applicant could
still have constitutional protection on the basis of the latter part of section 15
and that is freedom of thought, belief and opinion. The applicant mother in
the aforementioned case had enrolled her child at a private German school.
The mother objected to her daughter attending religious classes.
From the above it can be seen that both the heterosexual and the gay and
lesbian parent have competing rights, both protected by the Constitution.
There has to be a balancing of these rights under section 36 which is the
limitations clause. 251
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid, at 959.
250 1998 (4) SA 423 (1).
251 Ibid, at 424 B-c.
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One ofthe reasons why custody or access is denied to the gay or lesbian parent
is because such a placement would affect the moral standards ofthe child. 252
However, Bonthuys maintains that such an argument will not pass
constitutional muster in view of section 15 of the Constitution. 253 The former
argument presupposes that homosexuality is immoral. This assumption is
unconstitutional because everyone has a right to their own belief Majoritarian
morality is not necessarily the correct position.
2.3.5 Section 28:
Section 28 stipulates:
"(1) Every child has the right -
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative
care when removed from the family environment;
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance ill
every matter concerning the child."
The common-law best interest rule has been constitutionalized in section
28 (2).254 Both the South African Constitution255 as well as international law
regard the interest of children as being paramount in all matters concerning
children. Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
252 J de Waal, I Currie and G Erasmus - The Bill ofRights Handbook 3 ed (2000) 265.
253 E Bonthuys 'Awarding Access and Custody to homosexual Parents ofMinor Children: A
Discussion ofVan Rooyen v Van Rooyen" (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 298, at 310.
254 Ofthe Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa 108 of 1996.
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Child provides that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration".256 As already discussed earlier,257 the best interest
rule lacks clarity and the application thereof, lacks uniformity. Section 28 also
failed to provide the factors which the court ought to take into account when
considering the best interests of the child. However it is clear, that the purpose
of the clause is to protect the interest ofchildren and not the right of parents?58
K V K259 applied the provisions of section 28 (2). The parties were both from
the United States. They had divorced, in terms of which, the mother was
awarded custody of their son and the father, liberal access. The mother
subsequently prohibited the father from seeing the child on the basis ofalleged
sexual abuse. The father sought relief from the York County Family Court.
The mother did not attend the hearing but instead abducted the child and
moved to South Africa. The father who had not seen the child for two and a
half years, applied to the South African Court. The court had to decide
whether it was in the boy's interests to render a judgment regarding custody or
to return him to the United States where the court a quo would hear the matter.
The court was not satisfied that the child was settled in his new
environment.260 It was also not convinced that the child would be exposed to
the dangers of physical or psychological harm?61 The Hague Convention was
premised on the assumption that the abduction of a child to another country is
255 Ibid.
256 Of 1989 ratified by South Africa on 16 June 1995.
257 See Awards of Custody in respect of Gay and Lesbian Parents.
258 SWv F 1997 (1) SA 796 (0).
259 1999 (4) SA 691 (C), at 709 A-B.
260 Ibid, at 707 B-C.
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generally contrary to a child's interest. Van Heerden A J, stated that it would
seem then that the court where the child resides and not the foreign court
where the child is taken to, which is best qualified to decide the dispute?62
The court concluded that the alleged sexual abuse occurred in the United
States, the expert witnesses, both parties and their families were in the United
States. Hence the mother was directed to go back to the United States so that
the matter could be heard there.
The court could have adjourned the matter until the evidence was sent to South
Africa. But the court doubted whether such a delay would be in Z's interests.
The best interests of Z as is envisaged by section 28 (2) was the paramount
consideration. The court in an endeavour to ensure that the child was
protected until the court in the United States ofAmerica could act as guardian,
stipulated a list ofconditions to be undertaken by both parties.
Section 28 (2) does not add to the common law best interest rule but merely
serves to emphasize that the interests of the child is paramount.
In terms of section 28 Cl ) Cb) a child is entitled to family or parental care. A
child should not be separated from his or her parents unless it is in his or her
interests, for example where the child has been abused or neglected. Devenish
submits that the said section can be used by parents in support of an order for
261 Ibi~ at 707 C-D.
262 Ibicl, at 706 B-C.
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joint custody.263 Section 28 (1) (b) can also be used in support of access rights
because it acknowledges the benefit ofa child-parent relationship.
2.3.6 Section 36
Section 36 stipulates:
"(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited
only in terms of the law of general application.
(2) Limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom
(3) To determine whether limitations are reasonable
and justifiable, all relevant factors must be taken
into account including:
a. the nature ofthe right;
b. the importance of the purpose of the
limitation;
c. the nature and extent of the
limitation;
d. the relation between the limitation
and its purpose; and
e. less re°strictive means to achieve the
purpose."
263 D ·h .evems op Clt note 164, at 392.
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(i) 36(1) Only in tenns ofa law ofgeneral application
The law limiting the right must be of general application. This means
that the limitation may not be directed at specific individuals or
applicable to a single set of circumstances. If the courts deny custody
and access to the gay and lesbian parent on the basis of their
homosexuality, they would undoubtedly be targeting specific
individuals. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and
Others v Minister ofJustice and Others,264 the applicant argued that
the common the law crime of commission of an unnatural sexual
offence was too vague to constitute a "law of general application" as is
required by Section 36. By virtue ofthe law being vague, it also failed
to fulfil the requirement of reasonableness. It was contended that an
"unnatural sexual offence" is not clearly defmed. A citizen needed to
know exactly what the proscribed conduct was, and he had to be aware
of the consequences when he violated such a law.265
In President of the Republic ofSouth Africa and Another v Hugo,266
the majority held that the Presidential Act which granted early release
to mothers of young children did not violate the right to equality.
Mokgoro J, in her concurring judgment, held that the Presidential Act
amounted to unfair discrimination but that it was justified under
section 33 (1) of the Constitution.267 She stated that the Presidential
264 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W).
265 Ibid, at 741 H-J.
266 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).
267 Ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa 200 of 1993.
80
Act was a law of general application.268 Kriegler J, also in a dissenting
judgment, disagreed. He stated that the state award of early release to
certain prisoners was an executive act of the government and did not
amount to law. In addition it was not of "general application" because
it was directed at specific individuals.269
(ii) The limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality. In determining
what is justifiable, the courts must have regard to the dignity of an
individual as well as to the good of society by taking into account
various beliefs and lifestyles in our multicultural, heterogeneous
society.270 Our courts would therefore in many instances have to make
value judgments by striking a balance between two interested parties,
usually the State and the individual. In S v Makwanyane and
Another 271 the court laid down certain factors that need to be taken
into account when determining whether the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable. These factors were adopted in the fmal Constitution and
are now included in section 36.
I now propose to discuss these factors:
(a) The Nature of the Right
268 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), at 752 G.
'2fJ9 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), at 745.
270 Cachalia op cit note 159, at 115.
271 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
81
The courts have to establish the importance of the right, some rights
weigh more heavily than others.272 With regard to the gay and lesbian
parent, when one looks at the nature ofthe right one sees that the rights
that are being protected are basic human rights entrenched in almost
every Constitution. When the right that is being limited is closely
connected to the spirit and the purpose of the Constitution, which is
promoting human dignity, equality and freedom, then the courts ought
not to be too eager to limit such a right.273 The right to equality and
dignity falls in this category.
(b) Importance ofthe Purpose ofthe Limitation
The purpose of the limitation must be consistent with the objectives of
the State, which is to "promote values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.,,274
It could be argued that the purpose of limiting the rights of the gay and
lesbian parent to custody and access is to protect the interest of the
children.275 It is submitted that there must be clear evidence before the
court that the gay or lesbian lifestyle has exposed the child to harm. It
would not suffice to limit the parent's right so as to protect the moral
values ofone sector of society.276
(c) Nature and Extent ofthe Limitation
272 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus op cit note 252, at 144.
273 Davis op cit note 186, at 319.
274 Section 39.
275
Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
276 De Waal, Currie and Erasmus op cit note 252, at 146
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After establishing what the right is, the court has to examine the
limitation and its severity. The limitation must do no more than is
necessary to protect the right.277 The courts in adopting the rationality
test should ask the question, is the objective of protecting the interests
of the children directly proportional to the harm caused to the parent in
the denial ofcustody and access?
(d) Less Restrictive means to Achieve the Purpose
This test is linked to (c) above and enquires whether the individual
would suffer harm and whether there is some other means, which is
less restrictive.278 This thesis serves to document that a limitation is
not necessary at all.
(e) The Relationship between the Limitation and its Purpose
The means employed must be necessary to achieve the objective?79 In
applying the aforementioned principle, the enquiry is, whether the
denial of custody or access protects the interests of the child and if in
the affirmative, whether the protection of the interests of the child
warrants the gay parent's right to equality, to be outweighed. If the
objective is sufficiently important, then the issue is whether the means
employed are appropriate and whether they are proportional to the
object of the limitation?80 There must be a rational connection
between the means and the objective. In National Coalition for Gay
277 Ibid, at 147.
278 Davis op cit note 186, at 320.
279 R v Oakes 26 DLR (4th) 200.
280 De Vos op cit note 87 , at 692 - 693.
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and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister ofJustice and Others,281
the means employed were laws which discriminated against gays and
lesbians but the State did not provide any rational basis for the
discrimination or the objectives for such a law. The means would not
be proportional to the objective where it is based on prejudice and bias.
If parents are denied custody or access simply on the basis of their
orientation, the courts would be taking into account society's prejudices
and homophobic attitudes.282
The effect of the limitation clause was discussed in National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs.283 In the
latter case the applicants were gays and lesbians who claimed that their
unions were not recognised by the Aliens Control Act.284 Section 25
(5i85 which provided for immigration of spouses of permanent South
African residents, did not extend to homosexual couples in a
permanent relationship. It could be argued that the limitation served a
governmental objective which was to protect the traditional marriage
relationship. However, the court held that availing section 25 (5) to
gay and lesbian partners did not impinge on the governmental
objective. The court accordingly held that there was no justification
for the limitation.
281 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
282 De Vos op cit note 87, at 693.
283 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), at 34.
284 96 of 1991.
285 OfAlien Control Act 96 of 1991.
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In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Justice/86 the court stated that the criminalisation of sodomy, places
severe limitations on the gay's right to equality. A gay person would
not be able to give expression to his love.287 It interferes with his
normal functioning as a human being.288 The fact that gay sexual
relations were associated with a crime resulted in negative societaI
attitudes and perpetuated further discrimination.289 To balance the
interests, the court then examined the purpose of the limitation. The
respondent did not advance any reasons for the limitation. The court
found that there was no legitimate governmental purpose for the
limitation. The limitation was unjustified.
Dawood and Another, Shalabi and Another, Thomas and Another v
Minister of Home Affairs and Other;90 also dealt with the Aliens
Control Act.29 I Section 25 (9) Cbi 92 extended certain privileges to
foreign spouse and children of permanent South African citizens.
Foreign spouses were awarded immigration permits to live in the
country. Whilst waiting for their immigration permits they could
remain in South Africa provided that they were in possession of valid
temporary residence permits. The purpose of this section was to
protect marriage and family life. Section 25 (9) (b) refers to spouses
and does not apply to gays and lesbians. The effect of section 25 (9)
286 1999 (1) SA 6.
'2137 Ibid, at 31.
288 Ibid, at 28.
'2139 Ibid, at 31G.
290 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC).
291 96 of 1991.
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(b) is that it limits the right ofthe gay and lesbian to dignity. The right
to dignity protected the right to cohabit and marry. According to the
court, the limitation of the right to dignity, protected ones right to
cohabit and marry.
In President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa and Another v Hugo,293 the
purpose of the Presidential Act was to serve the interest ofthe children.
The issue was whether the goal of promoting the interest of the
children was proportionate to the discrimination of those fathers of
children under twelve? The court stated that the fathers were not
barred altogether and they could make application for remission. It
would not have been possible to release all prisoners because it would
have been too large a number. It would not have been practical to
evaluate each parent's case individually because of the time and costs
involved in administration. It at least benefitted some of the children,
if some of the parents were released. The discrimination against the
imprisoned fathers was justified in terms of section 33 (1) of the
Constitution.294
292 Ofthe Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991.
293 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 708, at 752.
294 200 of 1993.
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CONCLUSION
The best interest rule is flexible and allows for a wide discretion by judges. It is also
dictated to by the fluctuating norms and values ofsociety. Hence the case law lacks
consistency. This proves to be more problematic in custody cases involving gay and
lesbian parents because often the beliefs and values of society and judges may differ
from those of gay and lesbian parents.
Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 295 was a decision which was discriminatory and which
was based on prejudice. It included factors over and above those that were laid down
in McCall v McCall.296 In the former case, the court granted access with a string of
conditions. In justifying each of the conditions no substantial evidence was offered
by the court. The writer addressed these justifications. The only issue, which has any
substance, is the issue of teasing, taunting and harassment. However MP v s.p,297
pointed out that the latter could prove advantageous for a child. It is submitted that
negative responses from the community would add to the character of a child. The
court maintained further that the denial of custody or access does not mean that the
teasing would be eliminated. Moreover it was settled in Palmore v Sidotl98 that the
courts cannot endorse the intolerances of society by denying custody and access to
gay and lesbian parents.
295 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
296 1994 (3) SA 201(C).
297
169 N J Super, 425, at 436 - 39,404 A.2d 1256, 1262 -63 (App. Div 1979).
298 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
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Since the advent of the Constitution there is no marked difference in the current
judicial attitudes. Ex Parte Critchfield and Anothe/
99
relied on Van Rooyen
300
and
concluded that the children were not exposed to "confusing signals". This was in
spite ofthere being no empirical evidence to substantiate the theory that a homosexual
lifestyle would expose a child to confusing signals. In V v V,301 Foxcroft l's reference
to the mother's lifestyle suggests that there is something inherently wrong with a
lesbian lifestyle. On the pretext of protecting the best interest of the children, joint
custody was awarded. The court ultimately left the decision for the children to
consider as to which parent's lifestyle would be more harmful. It could be argued that
the criticism levelled against awards of joint custody, that it is an easy way out of
relieving the Court from making a decision on the question of sole custody,302 is
applicable in this instance.
The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution affords protection to the gay or
lesbian parent. There are various sections available to challenge discriminatory laws
namely; the right to dignity;303 the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion;304
the right to privacy;305 and the right to equality. It would appear that the right to
privacy does not adequately challenge discrimination towards gays and lesbians. The
equality-based approach seems to be the better approach. There must be a rational
basis when persons or categories of persons are treated differently and such
differentiation must be connected to a legitimate government purpose. If the gay or
lesbian parent were unsuccessful at this point then it would have to be proved that he
299 1999 (3) SA 132 (W), at 139 B-C.
300 1994 (2) SA 325 (W)
301 1998 (4) SA 169 (C).




or she was discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, which is
specifically included as a ground in Section 9(3).306 The gays' or lesbians' right to
equality may be curtailed by the limitation clause contained in Section 36. In order to
establish whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable it has to be established
inter alia that there is a rational connection between the objective of protecting the
interests of the child and the means employed, which is denying the gay or lesbian
parent custody or access. It must be conclusively proven that the homosexuality of the
parent is harmful to the child.
The writer cautions that in as much as we have a Constitution, which entrenches the
rights of the gay and lesbian parent, each case must be looked at individually. If it is
found that a particular child is unable to adapt to a gay or lesbian household or is
having difficulties in accepting his or her parent's homosexuality, it is a factor which
cannot be ignored.
305 Section 14.




A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
3.1 Child Custody and Access of Homosexual Parents in Australia
An examination ofcustody cases in Australia involving gay or lesbian parents,
shows that, there is no set pattern in the decisions of the judges. Although in
many cases the sexual orientation of the litigants was emphasized and a great
degree of negativity expressed by judicial officers towards gay and lesbian
parents, each decision seems to vary according to the attitudes of the various
judges. In the 1977 case of In the Marriage of N, l in an appeal from the
Supreme Court of New South Wales Family Law Division, Evatt CJ
maintained that homosexuality was a factor to be weighed when determining
issues of custody and she expressed the view that the parents' gay or lesbian
relationship was relevant if it was to the detriment of the children. She
maintained further that the real crux of the matter was to make a comparison
between the mother's household and the father's household in order to
ascertain which of the two was the better environment for the child to grow up
in.
At the same time, In the Marriage ofSpry,2 where the children were two girls
aged ten and seven, Murry J said "It is my view that lesbianism per se does not
make a mother unfit to have custody, but it is a factor which cannot be ignored
I (1977) F.L.e. 90-208.
2 (1977) 3 FamL.R. 11, 330.
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and must be taken into account with other factors that make up the total
situation.,,3 The court ordered that a psychologist's report be presented before
the court. The court was concerned about the children being exposed to
lesbianism if they were to be placed with their mother. The psychologist's
report indicated that these girls would not be growing up in a totally lesbian
environment. Evidence indicated that 50% of the mother's friends were
heterosexual and 50% were gay and lesbian.4 The younger daughter was
confused about the roles of her mother and her lover. This does indicate a
certain degree of confusion regarding gender identity. In any event, the
psychologist submitted that the lesbian environment did not automatically lead
to "deviant behaviour" of the child.5 Custody of the children was awarded to
the father. The mother was, however, allowed liberal access. Included, in this
provision of liberal access was a condition that the mother and her lover would
not display any sexual affection in front of the children.6
In the Marriage ofO'Reilly,7 was a case in which the court was faced with the
issue of whether to award custody to the lesbian mother or to an irresponsible
alcoholic father. The court considered the mother's homosexuality and
concluded that her sexual orientation did not detrimentally affect the children.
Custody was awarded to the mother with no restrictions or conditions
imposed. One should not draw too much attention to an award, favouring the
lesbian mother because of the choices available. The court had to choose
3 Ibid, at 11 334.
4 Ibid, at 11 333.
5 Ibid, at 11 334.
6 Ibid see Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA (W) 325, at 331 where a similar restriction was
imposed.
7 (1977) F.L.e. 90-300.
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between a lesbian mother and an irresponsible alcoholic. In view of the
general thinking of the courts at the time,8 one could remark that the court had
to make a choice between the lesser ofthe two 'evils'.
Also in 1977 in In the Marriage of Brook,9 two lesbian women who had
separated from their husbands were living together with their five children
from their respective marriages. The husband of one of the women, in
applying for custody of the children, alleged that his wife's relationship would
have a negative effect on the children's normal growth and development.
According to the psychiatric evidence, the court found that there was no
evidence to confIrm or support the husband's allegations. Io However the court
advocated three factors which would allegedly be detrimental to the interests
of children namely, frrstly, that it would cause the lesbian mother to be
incapable of caring for her children.
This is a questionable assumption as there is no evidence indicative of a
correlation between homosexuality and the nurturing or care ofa child. 11
Secondly; that the instability of the lesbian mother's relationship could cause
emotional harm to the children.
Thirdly, that the parent's lesbian relationship would subject the children to
teasing and taunting by their peers. This is a valid argument but as discussed
8 In the Marriage ofN (1977) F.L.C. 90-208.
In the Marriage ofSpry (1977) 3 Farn. L.R.
9 (1977) 3 Farn. L.N. No.81; [1977] F.L.C. 90-325.
10 (1977) F.L.C. 90-325.
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earlier it does not warrant denial of custody and access to gay and lesbian
parents. l2
To avoid social ostracism, custody was awarded to the mother subject to the
undertaking that there would be no display of affection between the women in
the presence of the children and in public. 13 In In the Marriage ofBroo/(4
reflects the same homophobic attitudes and prejudices as the South African
case of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen.l5 The judge in, In the Marriage ofBroo/(6
made many assumptions about the capabilities of a lesbian parent without any
evidence to substantiate them. The judge included a condition that there was
to be no display of affection between the mother and her partner before the
children or the public. This suggests that the judge was of the view that there
was something inherently wrong with homosexuality and that it should be
concealed. This was very similar to the condition imposed in the Van Rooyen
v Van Rooyen case because the judge was concerned about the children being
exposed to "confusing signals".l?
The court in In the Marriage ofCartwright, 18 recognized that there was a close
bond between the lesbian mother and her children especially since the eldest
child, who was fourteen years old, chose to stay with his mother. Here again,
a condition was imposed that there would be no display of the couple's lesbian
relationship to the children.
11 Baehr v Miike 1996 WL 694235 ( Hew.Cir.Q ).
12 See Chapter 2
13 ( 1977) 3 Fam. L.N. No. 81 : [1977] F.L.C. 90-325, at 90-325-326.
14 (1977) 3 Faro. L.N. No. 81; {1977] F.L.C. 9()"325.
15 1994 (2) SA 325.
16 (1977) 3 Faro. L.N. No. 81; {1977] F.L.C. 9()"325.
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In In the Marriage ofSchmidt,t9 the child in question, who was also fourteen
years old expressed the desire to live with her lesbian mother. Evatt CJ
maintained that homosexuality per se was not a disqualifying factor in the
determination of a custody application. It would only be relevant if the
parenting abilities ofthe gay or lesbian parent were affected in any way.20 The
judge went on to say that it was understandable that the father expressed
concerns and fears because he regarded the mother's lifestyle as abnormal and
deviant. However, these fears were held by the court to be unsubstantiated?l
It was also apparent from the evidence that the mother was not "fanatical
about her homosexuality.,,2o She indicated that it was her desire that the child
would be heterosexual as it would be "easier in terms of community
acceptance.,,21 The court seemed to have approved of the mothers' attitude of
keeping her relationship discreet.
In the 1992 case of C and JA Doyle,22 the custody dispute involved two boys
aged nine and thirteen respectively. The father was living in a gay
relationship. The elder child was living with his father and the younger child
with his mother. During one ofhis holidays with his father, the younger child
decided that he also wanted to live with his father. Hence, the mother
commenced custody proceedings in the Family Court for the custody of the
younger child, J. The father in his cross application sought custody of both his
sons Land J. As the mother consented to the father having custody ofL, the
17 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), at 328 C, 329 J and 330 A.
18 (1977) F.L.C. 90-302 in (1977 - 1978) 3 F.L.R.N 55.
19 (1979) 5 Fam. L.R. 421.
20 Ibid, at 424.
21 Ibid, at 428.
20 Ibid, at 424.
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only issue remaining, was the custody of the younger son J. Justice Hannon
referred to the 1983 case of L and L/3 which expounded the essential and
relevant issues to be considered in a custody dispute, involving a gay or
lesbian parent. The judge regarded the following eight factors laid down in
the case ofLand L by Baker J as a very useful checklist:
1. The fIrst issue was whether children would become gay or lesbian
themselves if gay and lesbian parents raised them.
2. The court then considered the possibility that the children would be
subjected to teasing, taunting or ostracism.
3. The third issue in L v L24 was whether the gay or lesbian parent was
capable of giving the child the same love and affection as a
heterosexual parent and whether the gay or lesbian parent would be
just as responsible as the heterosexual parent.
4. Another issue considered was whether the child would receive a
balanced sex education from the parent.
5. A further issue, considered by the court was whether the children ought
to have had access to knowledge of their parent's sexual orientation.
21 Ibid, at 424.
22 (1992) 15 Fam.L.R 274.
23 (1983) F.L.C. 91-353.
24 Ibid.
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6. The court then considered whether the children needed a parent of the
same sex to emulate.
7. The issue whether the child needed a male and a female parent was
also considered.
8. Lastly Baker J considered the parent's attitude towards religion.
In respect of the first factor, the judge concluded that this possibility was not
scientifically substantiated.
With regard to the second factor, the court held that the fact that one of the
parties had a deviant lifestyle is not relevant in itself. It is only relevant in so
far as it directly or indirectly affects the welfare of the child. The possibility
that the child would be subjected to ostracism was directly linked to the
welfare of the child?5
In a separate case being that ofJarman v Lloyd 26 the issue of peer teasing and
taunting was also considered. The court stated that the fact that the mother
was a lesbian was an undisputed fact and one which the court had no capacity
to change by any order that it made. Neither could an order of court change
the character of some of the nasty community members.27 The court
maintained further, that teasing, jeering and taunting was an integral part of a
child's growing up process. A child must enable himself to deal with such
25 Ibid, at 277.
26 (1982) 8 FamL.R. 878.
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issues in order to develop into a well-adjusted adult and should not be shielded
from certain realities of life. The judge was therefore more in favour of the
lesbian mother's approach of endeavouring to maintain an open-minded,
comfortable relationship with her children so that they would be able to
overcome problems together. The judge regarded the father's approach of
wanting to shield his children from possible ostracism as unconstructive.
28
Similarly, in Spry v Spry,28 Murray J stated that the children had to
acknowledge their parent's sexual orientation and they had to come to terms
with it. In C and JA Doyle, the court stated that in dealing with the question of
negative community attitudes towards homosexuality and its impact on the
children, the important issue was the awareness of the gay or lesbian parent of
the problem and the manner in which they would cope with it. The extent to
which a parent supports his or her child would be taken into account. In this
particular case the judge stated that the father and his lover were aware of the
possibility of negative community attitudes and they had taken the necessary
steps to ensure that their relationship was discreet. The court found that the
duration of the father's relationship with his lover and the fact that the children
were comfortable with it would make it easier for them to cope with external
negative attitudes?9 Otlowski30 in his analysis of the Doyle31 case,
commended the court for this approach. Goodman32 maintains that whenever
courts are faced with child issues involving a minority group, be it racial,
27 Ibid, at 890.
28 Ibid, at 891.
28 (1977) F.L.C. 76,447.
29 Op cit note 22, at 278.
30 M Otlowski 'Family Court Awards Custody, to Homosexual Father' (1992) 11:2 University of
Tasmania Law Review 261, at 267.
31 (1992) 12 Fam. L.R 274.
32 E Goodman 'Homosexuality of a Parent: A New Issue in Custody Disputes' (1979) 5 Monarch
University Law Review 305, at 312 and 313.
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religious or otherwise, then the possibility of ostracism would always be
raised. He submits that the parent in the less dominant culture is at a
disadvantage and punishment of the latter cannot be justified on the pretext
that it is in the interests of the child. He submits that there must be clear
evidence that the child is "uncomfortable in his environment" before denying
custody to the non-conforming parent.
Thirdly, the court in C and JA Doyle found that the father had a deep genuine
love for both his sons.33 It is submitted that the requirement that a parent must
be capable ofproviding love and affection is not unique in that its applicability
is general and also applies to heterosexuals.34 The question that the court
should have asked is which parent is more capable of providing love and
affection and not whether a gay or lesbian parent can provide the love that a
heterosexual parent can.
Fourthly, a balanced sex education is important for the child's normal sexual
development. It requires a great degree of objectivity from the parent. This
requirement of a balanced sex education can only be answered by looking at
the facts of each particular case. In Doyles36 case there was no evidence to
prove the contrary.
Fifthly, with regard to the children being exposed to the knowledge of their
parent's sexual orientation, the court stated that the children in Doyle's case
33 (1992) 12 Fam. L.R. 274.
34 See McCall v McCall1994 (3) SA 201 (c).




possessed the knowledge that their father was gay and they were not
uncomfortable about it.37
With regard to whether children needed a parent of the same sex to emulate
and whether children needed a male and a female parent figure. In C and JA
Doyle38 the judge stated that in a society with many imperfections and flaws, it
is difficult to ascribe to the latter. It is submitted that with the current divorce
statistics many children inevitably grow up in single parent households. In
addition there are parents who don't marry. The single parent may be male or
female. In such an instance the child does not have the benefit of a male and
female parent, neither does the child have a same sex parent to emulate. On
the other hand being raised in a single parent househoId does not exclude
opposite gender role models for the child because ofcontact with relatives and
friends. Additionally, in the case of divorce, access rights ensure the
continuity of relationship with the non-custodian parent.
Lastly, the aspect of religion was dismissed by the judge in C and JA Doyle39
as being irrelevant in the custody dispute.
After considering each of the above factors, Justice Hannon held that the
evidence indicated that the father's lifestyle did not affect the children
detrimentally. A significant factor was that the boy, J, expressed a genuine
desire to live with his father. The mother had contended that her biggest fear
was that J would be placed in moral danger. However the court found that she
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was quite amenable to her elder son staying with his father which was clearly
inconsistent with her contention.35 Custody was awarded to the father.
Interestingly, unlike many of the aforementioned cases,36 no undertakings
were required of the father. Goodman questions the applicability of an
undertaking. He argues that the latter are discriminatory in that they are not
universally imposed. In addition, there is always the problem of
enforceability. It would be almost impossible to monitor a relationship
between two people, let alone a sexual relationship. Thirdly, he advocates that
these undertakings equip the non-custodian parent with a tool for constantly
alleging a breach ofthe order?7
In the 1995 decision of In the Marriage ofA and J,38 the court found that the
lesbian mother and the father had always shared parenting, and that there were
times when the father had contributed more to the caretaking ofthe child, than
the mother. The mother confirmed that regular contact with the father was
necessary for the child and that he was the appropriate role model for the
child. The court looked at the welfare of the child rather than the mother's
lesbianism. It was evident that the child had a good relationship with both his
parents and that both parents were able to provide the child with material
comforts as well as meet his emotional needs adequately. It is apparent from
the latter two cases that the parent's sexual orientation would only be relevant
39 Ibid.
35 Ibid, at 283-284.
36 In the Marriage ofSpry (1977) 3 Fam.L.R.ll, 330.
In the Marriage ofBrook (1977) F.L.C. 90-325.
In the Marriage ofCartwright (1977) F.L.C. 90-302.
37 Goodman op cit note 32, at 315.
38 (1995) 19 Fam.L.R 260.
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to the extent that they impinge on the welfare of the child. The courts focused
on the welfare of the children and not on the parents' homosexuality.
CONCLUSION
A study of the cases in Australia in the 1970's indicates the conservative attitudes of
the judges. In In the Marriage ofSchmidt,39 Evatt Cl reiterated the remarks made in
In the Marriage ofN,40 in that a parent's homosexuality is only relevant if it were to
the detriment of the child. In Spry v Spry,41 although the mother was denied custody
she received liberal access. However, the court was concerned about the children
being exposed to their mother's lesbianism and imposed certain conditions. Similarly
a condition was imposed in In the Marriage of Cartwright. 42 In the Marriage of
Brook43, the court imposed a condition that there was to be no display of affection
between the women before the children or in public.44 The court however
acknowledged the suitability of the mother as a parent and awarded custody to her.45
It would appear that the attitudes of the judges at the time were conservative and that
they held many fears and reservations regarding gays and lesbians. One observes a
trend of awards tempered with caution. Conditions were imposed to ensure that gay
relationships were kept discreet. Gays and lesbians were not barred from custody and
access altogether. But, the case studies suggest that the judges were not comfortable
with the gay and lesbian lifestyle, they would not encourage it nor propagate it.
39 (1979) 5 Faro. L.R. 421.
40 (1977) F.L.C. 90-208.
41 (1977) 3 Fam. L.R. 11,330.
42 (1977) F.L.C. 90-302 in (1977-1978) 3 F.L.R.N. 55.
43
(1977) 3 Fam. L.N. No. 81 : [1977] F.L.C. 90-325.
44 Ibid, at 90-325-326.
45 Ibid.
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A decade later the case of L v L,46 also included stereotypes inter alia; whether the
children would become gay or lesbian and whether the gay or lesbian parent would
provide the same love and affection as a heterosexual would. The checklist suggests
that the courts were not satisfied with the capabilities of gay and lesbian parents. In
1992, in C and J A Doyle47, the court dismissed the stereotype that the children in gay
or lesbian households would also become homosexual because it was scientifically
unsubstantiated. The court applied each of the eight factors contained in L v L48
objectively and without prejudice. Custody was awarded to the father and no
conditions were imposed.49 It is submitted that Justice Rannon made a decision on the
merits of the case and did not allow his decision to be clouded by society's
perceptions. Similarly in In the Marriage ofA and J,50 the court did not focus on the
mother's lesbianism but looked instead at the best interests of the child. There seems
to be no uniformity in the decisions of the courts. In the last two cases, there appears
to be a move, although uncertain towards an objective, unprejudiced examination of
the facts of the case, with a view to ensuring the best interests ofthe child.
46 (1983) F.L.C. 91-353.
47 (1992) 15 Fam. L.R. 274.
48 (1983) F.L.C. 91-353.
49 (1992) 15 Fam. L.R. 274.
50 (1995) 19 Fam. L.R. 260.
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3.2 An Investigation into Custody and Access of the Homosexual Parent in
Canadian Family Law
3.2.1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms51
The effect that the Canadian Charter of Rights has had on gay and lesbian
custody and access issues in Canada, is significant because South Africa in
developing its Bill ofRights has borrowed heavily from the Canadian Charter
ofRights.52
Section 15 (1) ofthe Canadian Charter stipulates:
(l) "Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) 53Subsection (1) does not preclude any law,
programme or activity that has at its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic
5\ Schedule B to the Constitution Act of 1982, Part 1, Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms
Hereinafter referred to as Canadian Charter ofRights or the Charter.
52 Ibid.
103
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability. ,,54
According to R v Turpin55 the purpose of section 15 is to protect groups who
are disadvantaged socially, politically and legally. In an attempt to defme
equality, the court in R v Turpin56 stipulated that the demands and burdens that
the law placed on its people must be the same for all persons. All persons
must be afforded the same benefits and opportunities of the law. In applying
this test to gays and lesbians any law which treats gays and lesbians
differently or "more harshly" would constitute a breach of the equality
clause.57 In Andrew v Law Society ofB. C,58 the plaintiff proved that he was
denied access to the legal profession whilst others possessing the same
qualification were allowed access. Hence he proved that he suffered a
disadvantage.
The next step in establishing whether there has been a breach of section 15 is
to enquire whether the prohibitory law is discriminatory.59 Section 15
guarantees equality without discrimination and, in particular, "without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.,,60 Andrews v Law Society of B.c!4
reflects the importance of proving discrimination. Andrews applied for
admission to the legal profession. His admission was denied on the basis that
54 Ibid
55 (1989) 1 S.C.R 1296, at 1333.
56 Ibid, at 1329.
57 Ibid, at 1329-30.
58 (1989) 1 S.C.R 146.
59 Ibid, at 182.
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he was not a Canadian citizen. Andrews established discrimination hence he
was able to prove a breach of section 15." In order to establish discrimination
one has to prove discrimination on the basis of one of the characteristics
stipulated in section 15. Like the equality clause in the American Bill of
Rights, sexual orientation is not enumerated as a ground in the Charter. The
question then posed is, whether sexual orientation, being a ground which is
not enumerated, falls under the umbrella of protection under section 15? In
order to answer this there is a need to look at the groups, which are
specifically included. Some of the characteristics of the listed groups are the
following:
(a) They have endured a history ofdiscrimination61
(b) They are a minority group, disadvantaged socially, legally and lacking
political power.62
(c) Immutability ofthe personal characteristics.
It is submitted that gays and lesbians "have endured a history of
discrimination" and they are a minority group and have been disadvantaged
socially, legally and politically. The issue of immutability was discussed in
Vuysey v Correctional Services ofCanada.63 In the latter case, the court made
reference to the various grounds specifically mentioned in section 15, for
example race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour and age, highlighting that
60 Ofthe Charter.
64 (1989) 1 S.C.R 146.
61 Ibid, at 175.
62 B Ryder 'Equality Rights and Sexual Orientation: Confronting Heterosexual Family Privilege'
63 (1990) 9 Canadian Journal ofFamily Law 39, at 175.
(1990) 29 F.T.R. 74, at 78.
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these were immutable characteristics. The court regarded gays and lesbians as
being analogous to all these disadvantaged groups because homosexuality is
also immutable. The aforementioned case seems to indicate that immutability
of the personal characteristics is a requirement under section 15. In all of
these listed characteristics, namely race, colour etcetera there is no element of
choice but rather something "inherent". In other words, this is something that
goes to the core ofa person. Immutability is a reference to the very essence of
a person and not a reference to what the person does. Homosexuality, then
because of its immutability is a reference to a person's inner being as opposed
to his or her conduct.64 Therefore a judgment ordering a gay or lesbian parent
to restrict his or her lifestyle or lose custody of the children is unjustified.
Homosexuality has all the characteristics of the listed groups, namely, a
history of discrimination, a disadvantaged minority group and immutability.
It can therefore be regarded as analogous, thus deserving protection.
Superficially, the rights of gay and lesbian parents appear to be protected by
section] 5 and section 2 of the Charter.
Section 2 stipulates:
"everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) Freedom ofthought, belief, opinion and expression
(b) Freedom ofassociation"
However, this equality and freedom can be curtailed by the limitation clause
contained in section ] of the Charter.
64 P.W Hogg Constitutional Law o/Canada 3rd ed (1992) 1167-1168.
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Section 1 provides:
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society"
The case ofR v Oakei5 illustrates the dYnamics ofsection 1. The accused was
found in possession of narcotics. In dealing with whether the violation was
permissible in terms of section 1, the court raised two important issues:
a) the objective of the limitation must be of sufficient importance to
outweigh the rights;
b) the means employed to serve the purpose must be reasonable and
justifiable66
The court found that the objective of protecting society from the dangers
associated with drugs was sufficiently important to override the constitutional
right as contained in section 11 (dt7 of the Charter.68 The next step is to test
the reasonableness of the objective. To determine the reasonableness the court
used the proportionality test which is threefold and which requires the
following:
(a) there must be a rational connection between the means and the
objective;
65 (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200.
66 Ibid, at 227.
67 SII (cl) stipulates: 'Any person charged with an offence has the right, to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty'.
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(b) the limitation must interfere with the right as little as possible; and
(c) there must be a proportionality between its effects and its objective
The court found that the first requirement of there being a rational connection
between the means and the objective was not met. The court held that
possession of a small quantity of drugs could not lead to an inference of
possession for the purpose of trafficking.69 In other words the presumption
contained in section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act was not rational in that it
included all possession of narcotics irrespective of its quantity. When the
rational connection test failed, the section 1 enquiry was stopped.
The second requirement that the limitation must interfere with the right as little
as possible can be literally understood and is the one requirement which many
of the laws fail to meet.70
The third requirement is a test to establish whether there is a correlation
between what the law has set out to do and what the law was really
accomplishing.
Canada has a Bill ofRights wherein gays and lesbians although not specifically
included in the equality clause, but being an analogous group, receive
protection. In Egan v Canada/1 the applicants were living in a permanent,
stable same-sex relationship since 1948. Egan received certain benefits under
68 (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200, at 229.
69 Ibid, at 229-230.
70 Ibid, at 878.
71 (1995) 124 DLR (4) 617.
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the Old Age Security Act, which provided for an allowance to persons of a
certain income category, from the age of 60 to 65. When Egan became a
pensioner at age 65, his partner applied for the 'spousal allowance' but the
application was rejected. The allowance was only available to persons living
in heterosexual relationships, for more than a year. The court held that
although gays and lesbians were not specifically protected by the Charter, they
were an analogous group and received protection. Gay and lesbian parents
may then argue that the constitutionally entrenched right to equality guarantees
their right to custody and that they should not be discriminated against.
However this right can be limited in terms of section 1 of the Charter. The
objective in denying gay and lesbian parents custody or access would be to
protect the interest of children. The interest of children is of paramount
importance, but can the courts justify discriminating against gay and lesbian
parents, to safeguard the interest ofchildren? The courts would only be able to
justify discrimination against gay and lesbian parents if there was sufficient
evidence to prove that the latter posed a real danger to the children.
3.2.2 Custody and Access Disputes of the Gay and Lesbian Parent
On the one hand there is a Bill of Rights protecting the rights of the gay and
lesbian parent and on the other, there is a best interest rule which protects the
rights of the child. In Canadian law, section 16 (18) of the Divorce Act72
stipulates that the custody of a child is awarded solely on the basis of the "best
interests" of the child. In the case of Young v Young,73 the court held that the
72 Of1985.
73 (1993) 4 S.C.R. 3, 49 RF.L. (3d) 117, B.C.L.R
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wording of section 16 (8)74 requires the court to look only at the "best interests
of the child." Consequently no consideration is to be given to parental
preferences and "rights".
Section 16 (10)75 which provides for access stipulates:
"a child of a marriage should have as much contact
with each spouse as is consistent with the best
interests of the child and for that purposes, [the court]
should take into consideration the willingness of a
person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such
contact. "
The Ontario Children's Law Reform Ace6 stipulates that in maintaining the
best interest rule the judge shaH consider "aB the needs and circumstances of
the child." In ensuring the best interest of the child the judge has wide
discretionary powers. The exercise of such powers could prove to be
detrimental to the welfare of the child if abused. The judge must ensure that
he does not base his decision on his or her moral standards in response to the
parent's conduct, values or lifestyle. The judge must only enquire into such if
it is in the child's interest to do SO.77 Certain factors taken into account can
operate contrary to the interests of the gay and lesbian parent. Contained in
such section is a provision that the custodian parent must provide a permanent
74 Ofthe Divorce Act of 1985.
75 Ofthe Divorce Act of 1985.
76 R.S.O. 1990 C.c. 12, 24.
77 W.L Gross 'Judging the Best Interests ofthe Child: Child Custody and the Homosexual Parent'
(1986) 1 Canadian Journal ofWomen and the Law 505, at 508.
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and stable family unit.78 Canadian law prevents gays and lesbians from
providing such a family unit because same-sex marriage is prohibited.
79
There
are also no statistics to prove that gay and lesbian relationships are
impermanent and unstable because of the numerous undisclosed gay and
lesbian relationships and the difficulty of obtaining a proper census. Some
gays and lesbians are still very secretive and some would even lie, denying
vehemently their homosexuality for fear of losing their children.80 In
Ewankiw v Ewankiw81 the court's fmding was that the lesbian mother lied
about her sexual orientation and a negative inference was drawn from this.
Joint custody was granted and the father was given primary care and control
In Canada homosexuality per se is not a bar to custody.82 However, it appears
that the decision hinges on how discreet a gay and lesbian is about his or her
relationship. This issue was discussed in the 1974 decision of Case v Case,83
the fITst Canadian case involving a gay and lesbian parent. After expressing
that homosexuality was not a bar in itself, the court made reference to the
mother's political activities. The mother held office as vice president of a gay
club. She had also invited members of the club to her home. The judge feared
that the children would have too much contact with people of "abnormal tastes
and proclivities".85 The mother was denied custody of her two children.
78 Ibid.
79 Ladyland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) (1993), 104 D.L.R (4th) 214
(Ont.Gen.Div.).
80 S.B Boyd 'Lesbian (and gay) Custody Claims: What Difference does Difference make?' (1997) 15
Canadian Journal ofFamily Law 131, at 137-138.
81 (1994) 99 Man.R (29) 302 Q.B. (Fam.Div.).
82 Case v Case (1974) 18 R.F.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.).
Bezaire v Bezaire (1980) 20 RF.L. (2d) 361 (Ont CA).
83 (1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.).
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Two years later, in sharp contrast to the Case v Case85 decision, was the case of
K v K.86 Mrs K unlike Mrs Case led a very private life and was not a gay rights
activist. The judge was reassured that the relationship between Mrs K and her
lesbian lover would be a discreet one.87 The judge also dealt with the issue of
community attitudes and negativity expressed by other children. He
acknowledged that there was a problem, but that it was no different from one
experienced by children of a home where the parents were of different races.
89
It is apparent from both Case v Case88 and K v K,89 that a distinction was
drawn between the lifestyle of the two lesbian mothers. Where the mother had
led a discreet life and kept her lesbianism a secret from the community, she had
a better chance ofobtaining custody ofher children.
Brownstone submits that from the two aforementioned cases, it appears that
participation by gay and lesbian parents in gay liberation activities would be
viewed negatively by the Canadian courts. However he submits further that
such participation should not automatically bar gay parents from custody. The
conduct of parents who are gay rights activists should only be a determining
factor where it is to the detriment ofthe child.90
85 Ibid, at 136.
85 (1974) 18 RF.L.132 (Sask Q.B.).
86 (1976), 2 W.W. R462 (Alta, Prov. et.).
87 Ibid, at 468.
89 Ibid, at 467.
88 (1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.).
89
(1976),2 W.W.R 462 (Alta. Prov. et.)
90 H Brownstone 'Homosexual Parent in Custody Disputes' (1980) 5 Queens Law Journal 199, at 218.
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Another important distinction that can be drawn from these two cases is that in
the Case v Case91 decision, the wife's lover failed to testify and the court drew
a negative inference from this. In K v K, 92 the mother's lover did testify and the
court was confident that the couple would provide a loving home for the child.
Where the parent has formed another relationship it is important for that third
party to testify so that the court can make an informed decision regarding
custody, as that third party acts as a surrogate parent. Failure ofthat third party
to testify would lead a court to draw a negative inference therefrom, more so if
that parent happens to be gay or lesbian.93 A comparison between the Case v
Case94 decision and that of Re Reid and Reit!5 needs to be drawn. The latter
case was one, which involved heterosexual parents. One parent had his
common law spouse testify in court whilst the other did not. The court ordered
that the children have separate legal representation. Failure of one surrogate
parent to testify was not sufficiently material to deny custody but was rectified
by the appointment of independent legal counsel, who would have the interest
of the children at heart. However, in the Case v Case96 decision, failure to
testify was fatal and there was no ordering of separate representation.
This "open-discreet test", dependant on whether the gay or lesbian openly
displays his or her sexual orientation was also applied in cases, where the
father was gay. In the 1978 case of Dv D,97 the court was very pleased that the
father was someone who was discreet about his homosexuality and who
91 (1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.), at 136.
92 (1976), 2 W.W.R 462 (AIta. Prov. Ct), at 469.
93 Brownstone op cit note 90, at 221.
94 (1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.).
95 (1976), 11 O.R (2d) 622 (HC).
96
(1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.), at 136.
113
promised that he would not bring his children into much contact with gays and
lesbians. The testimony of the father's partner was also a contributing factor.
Although the mother was an unsuitable parent and the father had de facto
custody, the court was very concerned about the father's suitability because of
his homosexuality.
The "open-discreet test" was applied in the 1980 decision of Barkley v
Barkley.98 The lesbian mother was very discreet about her relationship. She
was of the opinion that her daughter would become heterosexual. She obtained
custody of her daughter. A case which followed Case v Case
99
and one which
went before the Court ofAppeal, is the 1980 case ofBezaire v Bezaire.
100
The
mother had breached various provisions of the original order; the most
important being that she was to live alone. The judge of the Court of Appeal
emphasized that homosexuality was not in itself a bar to custody but the
determining factor was the effect of that sexual orientation on the welfare of
the child. The judge took into account that the children would be subjected to
teasing and taunting because of their parent's homosexuality and awarded
custody to the father. 10 1 In 1992, in N v N,102 a visitor who frequented the home
of the mother, testified that the mother did not openly exhibit her lesbianism.
The mother was successful in her application. Notwithstanding the mother's
success, it must be noted that reference was made to the father's "traditional
97 (1978),20 O.R (2d) 722 (Co. et).
98 (1980) 28 O.R (3d) 141 (prov. Ct.).
99 (1974) 18 RF.L. 132 (Sask Q.B.).
100 (1980) 20 R.F.L (2d) 361 (Ont. C.A.).
IDI Ibid, at 365.
102 (1992) B.C.J. No. 1507 (QL) (S.C.).
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attitudes" and the concerns of the father. 103 Although the evidence led settled
these concerns, there was an onus on the mother to ensure that the father and
ded b h I ·· 104 S . 24
105
the children were not offen y er sexua onentatIon. ecbon
stipulates that "the past conduct ofa person is not relevant to a determination of
an application ... unless the conduct is relevant to the ability of the person to
act as a parent of a child." Gross106 approves of the Nexus approach. This
approach takes into account the parent's homosexuality, only to the extent that
it causes harm to the children concerned. She considers the approach to be a
safeguard against possible abuse ofjudges of their wide discretionary powers.
In D v D,107 although the mother was an unsuitable parent and the father was
already exercising custody, the court was concerned about the father's
homosexuality. According to Gross, the court should not have speculated but
should have established whether real harm would be caused to the children.
She maintains that the court ought to have examined the following factors
namely; the sexual orientation of the children, the effect of peer pressure
regarding the relationship and the effect of the father's homosexuality on the
relationship between the children and their father. 108 The court in D v D
awarded custody because the father did not openly "flaunt" his
homosexuality. 109 The court did not meet the Nexus requirement in
establishing that the father's homosexuality would not prejudice the interests of
the child. Instead the court without examining evidence concerning the child,
speculated that the father's discreteness of his sexual orientation adequately
103 Ibid, at para 7-8.
104 Boyd op cit note 80, at 141.
105 OfChildren's Law Reform Act ofOntario.
106 Gross op cit note 77 , at 509.
107 (1978), 20 O.R (2d) 722 (Ont. Co. a.).
108 Gross op cit note 77, at 526.
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protected the child's interests. Gross submits that the court in Barkley v
BarkleyllO followed the same pattern as D v D: l1 The judge gave a list of
unsubstantiated factors which he took into account in his award of custody. He
did not state how factors such as militancy of the gay parent or disclosure of
the homosexuality would harm the child.112 I agree with Gross that there has to
be evidence of real harm to the child. The acceptance of the court of the
mother's opinion that her daughter would choose a heterosexual lifestyle is also
questioned. Firstly, the mother is not a psychological expert. Secondly, even
if it were true, does it mean that the court would have refused custody if the
mother had thought otherwise. This trend ofthought suggests a rejection of the
gay or lesbian lifestyle and an assumption that a heterosexual lifestyle is the
correct choice. According to Gross it is not really in the interests of the child
that the gay or lesbian parent is secretive about his or her sexual orientation.
According to research113 a lesbian mother who freely expressed her
homosexuality was psychologically healthier. Expression would include
"having a relationship with a female partner, cohabiting with a lover, disclosure
of sexual orientation to a significant number of people, being active in the
feminist political movement, and being in frequent contact with the lesbian
community. This would impact positively on the mother's relationship with her
children. It has been found that mothers who have accepted their
109 Ibid.
110 (1980) 16 RF.L. (2d), 13 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
III (1978),20 O.R (2d) 722 (Ont Co. n.).
112 Gross op cit note 77, at 526.
113 C. Rand, D.L.R Graham and E.I. Rawlings 'Psychological Health Factors the Court seeks to Control
in Lesbian' Mother Trials Journal ofHomosexuality '8 (1982) 27, quoted in W.L. Gross at 529.
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homosexuality, could more adequately assist their children in overcoming
I h . b 114prob ems suc as teasmg y peers.
In response to the "open discreet test" applied in the cases, Arnup submits that
it is apparent that those mothers, notwithstanding their lesbianism, who would
bring up their children in accordance with 'traditional values' were awarded
custody. 11 S The court in K v K, granted K custody, 'with some degree of
assurance that her child would be socialized in accordance with the dominant
values of society." 116 According to Arnup, there is a perception that the lesbian
mother threatens the social structures of society and the concept of capitalism.
In order for capitalism to survive, individuals in society must fit neatly into
roles. Men were the sole breadwinners and women were the child care-givers.
Now that the position has changed and more women have entered the
workforce, women are still the primary care-givers. However, she maintains
that lesbian mothers do not fundamentally upset the latter structure. In as much
as women do not care for husbands, they are still fulfilling their roles as
mothers in taking care oftheir children. 117
CONCLUSION
Through the last three decades in Canada, one sees little development in the custody
and access cases involving the gay or lesbian parent. The general approach of the
Canadian courts is based on the "open-discreet test". The overt nature of the conduct
114 Gross op cit note 77, at 529.
115 K. Arnup 'Mothers Just Like Others: Lesbians, Divorce and Child Custody in Canada' 1989 (3)
Canadian Journal o/Women and the Law (18, at 30).
116 Ibid.
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of the gay or lesbian resulted in the denial of custody and access or in the imposition
of conditions. In this test of ascertaining whether a homosexual openly displays his
or her sexual orientation belies a homophobic attitude based on prejudice.
Like the Australian courts, Canadian courts did not automatically bar gay and lesbian
parents from custody and access, but they were intent on keeping the gay and lesbian
lifestyle from the public arena. Gay parents who were discreet about their lifestyle
were rewarded with custody or liberal access rights.118 The "open-discreet test" was
taken to absurd lengths in the case of Bezaire v Bezaire.
1l9 In an earlier decision the
mother was ordered to live alone. It is submitted that this was not merely a case of
the mother being discreet about her sexual orientation but the judge was instructing
her as to how she was to live. By declaring that the mother was to live alone he was
in effect curtailing a meaningful or a permanent gay and lesbian relationship.
The Canadian Charter has not had any dramatic impact on custody and access cases
of gay and lesbian parents. This is evident from the case of Ewankiw v Ewankiw. 120
The Charter preceded this case and it is interesting to note that despite the
constitutionally protected rights contained in the Charter, the mother and her lesbian
lover chose to deliberately lie to the court so that their homosexuality could be
concealed. The fact that the lesbian mother chose to lie indicates that gay and lesbian
parents do not feel sufficiently protected by the Bill ofRights.
117 Ibid, at 30.
118 K v K (1976),2 W.W. R 462 (AIta, Prov. et.).
Dv D (1978),20 O.R. (2d) 722 (Co. et.).
Barkley v Barkley (1980) 28 OR (3d) 141 (Prov. Ct.).
Nv N(1992) RCI. No. 1507 (QL) (S.C).
119 (1980), 20 R.F.L. (2d) 361 (Ont. C.A.).
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In the majority ofthe cases mentioned above, the courts have held that homosexuality
per se is not a bar to custody. However Boyd argues that it may be all very well that
homosexuality per se is not a bar in itself, but the test is not neutral. This is because
heterosexuality is perceived as being the norm and gays and lesbians are perceived as
challenging the norm.121
~~~ (1994) 99 Man.R (29) 302 Q.B. (Fam.Div.).
Boyd op cit note 80, at 131 .
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3.3 An Investigation Into Custody And Access Of The Homosexual Parent In
American Family Law
In this discussion the writer proposes to investigate the tests used in custody
and access disputes through the last three decades and thereafter to examine
the relevant provisions of the American Constitution in order to establish the
current trend, in judicial decisions.
3.3.1 The Best - Interest - Rule
According to the Uniform Marriage Divorce Act, 122 the best interest rule of
the child is used in custody disputes. The "best interest" test includes the
following:
(1) the wishes ofthe child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes ofthe child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved
This best interest rule is used both in homosexual and heterosexual custody
cases. However, in gay and lesbian custody cases, in addition to the best
122 S402, 9A U. L. A.56! (1987).
120
interest rule, courts apply their own standards ofmorality. 123 The judge has to
make a decision on intimate family relationships based on information
presented by lawyers and expert witnesses. In making this decision, the best
interest's rule allows the judge flexibility and a wide discretion.
124
In America, before the 1970 s, lesbian mothers were afraid to disclose their
sexual orientation to the court for the obvious reason that it would be
detrimental to their claim for custody. However in the 1970 s more lesbian
mothers were disclosing heir homosexuality. Evan submits that the change in
family law and custody was a direct result of the conduct of gays and lesbians
as they began to affrrm their constitutional rights125 Hunter and Polikoff give
varied reasons for such "coming out", the one being that the feminist
movement had bonded women together.126 In the 1970 s, in the midst of gay
rights activism, the courts were still disposed to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Legal representatives were advised to encourage their gay
clients to avoid litigation by settlement out of court. 127 There were significant
changes, which impacted, on the rights of gay and lesbian parents in 1976.
The American Psychological Association passed a resolution, that custody,
adoption or foster parenting determinations would not depend on sexual
orientation.128 In the late 1970 s, researchers published the fIfst empirical
123 S.P Ali 'Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption' (1989) 22 University 0/California,
Davis 1009, at 1012.
124 S Susoeff 'Assessing Children's Best Interests when a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Towards a Rational
Custody Standard' (1985) 32 University o/California, Los Angeles Law Review 852, at 853 - 854.
125 M.W Evans 'Parent and Child' MJ.P.: An analysis ofthe Reliance ofParental Homosexuality in
Child Custody Detenninations' (1982) 35 Oklahoma Law Review 633.
126 N. D Hunter and N. D Polikoff'Custody Rights ofLesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation
Strategy' (1976) 25 Buffalo Law Review 691, at 691-692.
127 Ibid, at 715.
128 J.J Conger 'Proceedings ofthe American Psychological Association Inc, for the Year 1976'(1997) 32
American Psychology 408,at 432.
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study, dispelling the myths of homosexuality.129 The decisions handed down
by the Judges varied. The application ofthe same best-interest rule resulted in
various, often opposing judgements. This will become evident in the later
discussion ofthe approaches adopted by the American courts.
During the 1980 s biases of the judges continued, despite recognition of
domestic partnership agreements. l3O The best-interest rule bestowed a wide
discretion upon judges. In most instances, off course, the judiciary bore the
assumption that a parent's homosexuality was detrimental to the child l31
3.3.2 The Approaches Adopted By Courts in Custody and Access Disputes
Involving the Gay and Lesbian Parent
According to Evans, there were three approaches adopted by the courts: (i)
there were some courts which held that there was an irrebuttable presumption
that a gay and lesbian parent was unfit; whilst (ii) other courts accepted the
need for such children to maintain an ongoing relationship with their parents
but curtailed the gay and lesbian relationship by imposing conditions; and (iii)
there were courts which adopted the Nexus approach, in other words an
enquiry was held, as to the effect of the parents' sexual orientation on the
children.132
129 D Hitchens and B Price Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Cases: the Use ofExpert Testimony'
(1978-1979) 9 Golden Gate University Law Review 451.
130 D.L Chambers and N.D Polikoff ' Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth
Century' (1999) 33: 3 Family Law Quarterly 523, at 526.
131 R. G Bagnall, P. C Gallagher and J. L Goldstein 'Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody and Anonymous Parties' (1984) 19 Harvard Civil
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(i) The Irrebuttable Presumption Approach
This presumption is based on the stereotypical perceptions of society,
that gays and lesbians are inherently inadequate and unfit parents.
However Evans maintains that the courts must act objectively and not
d b . I . d· 133be swaye y socleta preJu Ices.
1. The irrebuttable presumption of the unfitness of gay and lesbian
parents is evidenced by the following cases, which the writer proposes
to discuss. In Nadler v Superior Court,134 the California Court of
Appeals held for the frrst time that homosexuality alone did not render
a gay parent unfit. This was restated in the case of In Re Marriage of
C b I . 135a a qumto. However eight years later, in Chaffin v Frye
136
,
another Californian case, the court held that the mother's lesbianism
rendered her unfit as a parent. In the trial court decision, the court
officer found that the mother was a capable parent. Notwithstanding,
custody was awarded to the grandparents. This decision was
reaffrrmed on appeal, even though the children expressed a desire to
live with their mother and gave evidence that they had seen no signs of
any sexual conduct. Almost a decade later, despite heightened gay
advancement, a court in the same state, made a decision declaring the
mother unfit, solely on the basis ofher lesbianism.
Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 497.
132 Evans op cit note 125, at 642.
m Ibid
134 255 CaI. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
135 100 Wash.2d 325,699 p.2d 866 (1983).
136 45 Cal. App.3d 3a, 119 Ca!. Rptr. 22 (1975).
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In L V D137 the facts weighed heavily against the father. The children
expressed the desire to live with their mother and complained of their
father being unaffectionate. They had formed a good relationship with
their mother's lover as opposed to having a poor relationship with their
stepmother.l3S Notwithstanding substantial expert evidence in favour
of the mother, the trial court denied custody and granted access subject
to the imposition of conditions. The Appellate court confirmed the
decision, without giving any substantiated reasons for its answer, on
the basis of the presumption ofunfitness ofthe lesbian mother. 139
In the case of Roe v Roe140 , the court held that the father's
homosexuality rendered him an unfit and improper custodian parent.
This presumption of unfitness has emerged from perceptions that
homosexuality is immoral. In the case ofJ.P v P. W, the gay father's
right to access was restricted in that he and the children were subject to
adult supervision. 141 A social worker appointed by the court to act as
curator ad litem gave evidence that the gay father was a conscientious,
responsible, loving and caring person.142 Notwithstanding such
evidence, the court concluded that the father's sexual orientation
would have a negative impact on the moral development of the child
137 630 S.W. 2d 240 (MO. Ct. Ap. 1982).
138 Ibid, at 242.
139 Ibid.
140 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E. 2d 691 (1985).
141 772 S.W. 2d 786 (M.O. et. App. 1989).
142 Ibid, at 791.
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and saw the need to protect minors from exposure to a gay and lesbian
lifestyle.
In the case of Col/ins v Col/ins, 143 the court also expressed the view
that a link existed between a parent's homosexuality and a child's
moral development. In this particular case the lesbian mother's
stability could be questioned because she had engaged in four different
lesbian relationships over a ten-year period as opposed to the father
who had maintained a single heterosexual relationship for nine years.
The court concluded that homosexuality was immoral and it was not a
lifestyle that children should choose.144
There are some courts, which instead of upholding the irrebuttable
presumption ofunfitness of the gay or lesbian parent require the gay or
lesbian parent to rebut the presumption that they are unfit. 145 Both the
irrebuttable and the rebuttable presumption are a mockery of the best-
interest rule. In adopting either presumption, the courts automatically
barred a gay or lesbian parent instead ofestablishing who would be the
most suitable parent. Hence the child's interests of the child are not
served.
143
1988 Tenn. App. Lexis 123 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988).
144 !bid, at 17.
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(ii) The Nexus Approach
When adopting the Nexus approach a court has to establish whether a
parent's homosexuality has any adverse effect on the child. In the
discussion of the cases to follow, one sees a balanced examination of
the facts, leading to favourable decisions for the gay and lesbian
parent. Amongst the fIrst courts to apply the nexus test was a Michigan
Appellate court in People v Brown, in which case no nexus was
found.146
In Leonard v Leonard, 147 the mother sought to curtail the access rights
of the gay father. The court found that the child had suffered no harm.
In Smith v Smith, 148 custody was awarded to the lesbian mother
because the child was in excellent care whilst with the mother. In
MP v s.p, 149 it was alleged that the mother's sexual orientation
caused embarrassment to the children, and had a detrimental effect on
them. The court in confrrming the custody order for the mother
indicated that the embarrassment suffered by the child would not be
affected by a displacement of custody. It was stated that the variation
of custody would not alter the root cause of the problem, which was
the mother's lesbianism. The court was of the opinion that living with
the mother would cause the character of the girls to be strengthened
and they will be in a position to make their own value judgements.
145 Constant A v Paul 344 Pa. Super 49, 496 A. 2d. (1985).
146 212 N.W. 2d 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973.
147 173 Pa. Super 424, 98 A 2d 638.
148 5 Fam. L. Rep (BNA) 24 50 (Cat. Super. Ct. Stains1aws County 1978.
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Bezio v Patenaude150 was hailed as a breakthrough with regards to the
application of the nexus test. The court decreed that there must be a
nexus between the parental unfitness and the parent's sexual
orientation. In other words there must be evidence of a detrimental
effect on the children. In awarding custody to the mother, the court
held that "there is no evidence that children who are raised with a
loving couple of the same sex are any more disturbed, unhealthy or
maladjusted than children raised with a loving couple ofmixed sex".151
In Doe v Doe, 152 the lesbian mother lived with her lover. She had
previously enjoyed joint legal custody and visitation rights but the
father applied for sole custody because of the mother's sexual
orientation. Both the Trial court and the Appeal Court confmned the
joint custody. The Appeal Court stated that a parent's lifestyle was not
the only factor to be taken into account and considered the foHowing
factors:
(1) that both the father and mother were loving parents;
(2) the fact that the child wished to live with both his parents;153
(3) the fact that the child had not been teased and taunted by his peers;154
and
149 404 A.2d 1256 (NJ. Super. 1979).
150 410 N.E. 2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
151 Ibid, at 1215-16.
152 16 Mass. App. et 499, 452 N.E. 2d 293 (1983).
153 Ibid, at 295-296.
154 Ibid, at 296.
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(4) the evidence of experts. Three of the psychiatrists supported the
mother, having joint custody ofthe child.
The court in Doe v Doe155 made a decision by an examination of all the facts.
Societal prejudices and the judges' own subjective views did not play a role.
In Guinan v Guinan, 156 the court found that the mother's sexual orientation
did not have an adverse effect on the child. In MA.B. v R.B157 the child in
question had general behavioural problems and experienced difficulties at
school. The court awarded custody to the gay father who resided with his
lover because the father's homosexuality did not have an adverse effect on the
child. In fact the child's performance at school was better under the father's
care. Juxtaposed to the afore-mentioned cases, a different approach was taken
in Kallas v Kallas.158 The court admitted that homosexuality did not
automatically bar a person from custody or access but considered it
sufficiently relevant to deny the mother any access which would include
sleepovers.159
Likewise in the case of NK.M v L.E.M60, the court held that there was no
automatic bar but removed the child from the mother's custody because of
possible future harm to the child even though there was no evidence to
substantiate such fear. The court made a decision with insufficient evidence
and indicated that it could not wait until actual damage was done to remove
155 16 Mass. App. et 499, 452 N.E. 2d 293 (1983).
156
102 AD. 2d 963,477 N.Y.S. 2d 830 (1984).
157
134 Mise. 2d 317,324,510 N.Y.S 2d 960 (Sop. et. 1986).
158 614 P. 2d 641 (Utah 1980).
159 Ibid.
160
606 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (MO. Ct App. 1980).
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the child from an "unwholesome environment.161 Paradoxically, the courts
that adopted the nexus approach in order to serve the best interests of the child
would deny custody and access at the slightest fear, suspicion or speculation.
In other words, these courts do not presume the unfitness of gay and lesbian
parents, but at the slightest negativity, no matter how minor or
unsubstantiated, and even at the cost of a more suitable custodian parent
would deny custody. Bagnall et al submit that there ought to be a requirement
of a "demonstrable" adverse effect rather than a "speculative" one.162
MJ.P V JG.p163 was a custody dispute, which involved a two and a half-year-
old child. The mother was involved in a committed lesbian relationship and
had gone through a formal commitment ceremony in public. Evidence by a
psychiatrist, a neighbour, the child's father and paternal grandparents
indicated that the child was a well adjusted, intelligent child and was well
cared for by the mother. Notwithstanding such strong evidence, the custody
order was reversed, placing custody with the father. The mother was granted
rights of access but no overnight visits and the child was prohibited from
contact with the mother's lover. 164 Evans submits that the court in this case
adopted the nexus approach but the enquiry was entangled with speculation
and homophobia. 165 In other words even though the courts would not presume
unfitness of the gay or lesbian parent, misconception and prejudice dictated
the ultimate decision.
161 Ibid, at 186.
162 Bagnall op cit note 131, at 523.
]63 640 P. 2d 966 (1982).
164 Ibid, at 212.
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Rosenblum submits that the nexus approach is the most logical and serves the
best interests of the child. In adopting the latter approach, the court does not
automatically assume that the gay or lesbian lifestyle of the parent would have
a detrimental effect on the child.
166
(iii) The Imposition of Conditions
Some courts have shifted away from the presumption of unfitness or
the per se approach for fear of it being too strict, towards a more
compromised approach. They have opted to grant access or custody
but with the imposition of conditions. These conditions may consist
of:
(a) Prohibition of overnight visits with the gay parent and his or
her partner;167
(b) An undertaking that the children would be prevented from
becoming aware ofthe same-sex relationship;168
(c) A prohibition that the child would not have any contact with
the lover;169
(d) An order that the gay or lesbian parent not live with his or her
partner, 170and
165 Evans op cit note 125, at 654 and 656.
166 D. M Rosenblum 'Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents' (1991) 36 Villanova Law Review
1665, at 168.
167 11Co ins v Collins No. 87 - 238 - 11, 1988 Tenn. App. Lexis 123 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988).
168 Mitchell v MitchellNo. 240665 (Cat. Super. Ct. Santa ClaraCounty 1972).
169 Pascarella v Pascarella 355 Pa. Super 5, 7,512 A. 2d 715, 716 (1986).
170 Schuster v Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626,629-30,585 p. 2d 130, 132-33 (1978).
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(e) An order that the gay or lesbian parent terminates the
relationship altogether. 171
Most if not all of these conditions are linked to the "open-discreet-
test". American courts have distinguished between overt relationships,
where the gay or lesbian parent openly displayed his or her sexual
orientation and covert or secretive relationships. Where the parents
were more exhibitionary in their conduct, there was a greater
probability of receiving unfavourable treatment. According to Fayer,
society would tolerate gays and lesbians to a certain extent as long as it
was concealed from the public. l72 In some instances, even where
relatives have accepted the gay or lesbian lifestyle, they would prefer
that the sexual orientation remains secretive. 173 This concept of
discreet conduct of gays and lesbians was maintained by the
imposition of conditions by the court, which prohibited gays and
lesbians from discussing gay issues with their children or having any
contact with their lovers. 174 Of all five conditions discussed, it is
apparent that the presence of a lover posed the greatest difficulty. In
the 1980 s notwithstanding the stability of the relationship, a gay
parent with a lover, was denied custody with limited access. 175
Bagnall et al compared heterosexual parents involved in a similar
relationship. They submit that the courts regard the latter relationships
171 NKMv L.E.M606 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (MO. Ct. App. 1980).
172
M. A Fayer 'Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together - Storytelling, Gender Role stereotypes, and
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men' (1992) 46:511 University afMiami Law Review
511, at 570.
173 Ibid, at 589.
174 Ibid, at 591.
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as being positive, as far as the children are concerned. Finally, they
concluded that major discrepancies existed because gays with lovers
received far less favourable and harsher treatment than their
176 d f· h·dheterosexual counterparts. Ju ges 0 Amencan courts ave Wl e
discretionary powers as to the election of the approaches, namely
irrebuttable presumption, nexus or the imposition of conditions
approach. When faced with a case, the Judge may opt for either of the
former approaches, which may be favourable or unfavourable to the
gay or lesbian parent. The latter could be quite extreme, because the
gay or lesbian parent could face outright denial of custody or access.
For a more compromised position the Judge may impose conditions or
place limitations on custody or access rights. A study of the cases in
the 1970 s and 1980 s indicates that there is no precedent or set pattern
for the court to follow. Irrespective, of which approach was adopted,
the cases showed stark contrast. This suggests that the gay or lesbian
parent is faced with uncertainties and it would just depend which court
and judicial officer is tasked with his or her decision.
3.3.3 Homosexual American Fathers
The hostility against gays, more particularly men was emphasized when the
Aids epidemic broke out in the United States because gays were a major risk
group.l77A gay father in a custody dispute faced a double-edged sword.
Firstly, like any other father applying for custody he has the Tender Years
175
176 N.KMv L.E.M606 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (MO. et. App. 1980) M.J.P. V J.G.P. 640 P. 2d 966 (1982).
Bagnall op cit note 131, at 530-531.
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doctrine178 against him. Although it has been under attack, and in some
instances even rejected by the courts, in ninety percent of custody cases, the
mother was awarded custody.179 There were a fewer number of gay men who
applied for custody as opposed to lesbian mothers. This may be attributed to
the fact that children do not form part of the gay world.
180
Secondly there is a
greater degree of societal acceptance of lesbians, as compared to their male
counterparts. Wishard submits that lesbian mothers have a greater prospect of
success in custody disputes than gay fathers dO.
181
3.3.4 Sexual Orientation and the American Constitution
The constitutional implications of homosexuality have serious ramifications
for the gay and lesbian as will be shown below.
The United States of America has a Bill of Rights entrenched in its
Constitution. The Constitutional provisions, which impact on homosexuality,
are the right to privacy; the equal protection clause; the due process clause;
and the right to freedom of association.
The right to privacy received constitutional stature not through constitutional
enactment but by judicial decision. The right to privacy was flfst discussed in
[77 L. H Tribe American Constitutional Law, (1988) 1934.
178 Also known as the maternal preference rule, in terms ofthis doctrine the custody ofgirls ofany
age and young children are awarded to the mother.
179 D. R Wishard 'Out of the Closet and into the Courts: Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody'
(1989) 93 Dickinson Law Review 401, at 407-408.
180 F. W Bozett 'Gay Fathers: Evolution ofthe Gay-Father Identity' (1981) 51 (3) American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry 552, at 555 - 559.
181 Wishard op cit note 179, at 407.
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Griswold v Connecticut, 182 a case which dealt with whether married couples
could use contraceptives.
A gay or lesbian may argue that his or her right to privacy is being curtailed.
The question posed is, does the right to privacy protect the gay and lesbian?
The right to privacy was previously regarded as being settled in Bowers v
Hardwick. 183 Bowers was arrested in his bedroom by the Atlanta police for
engaging in gay conduct with a consenting adult. The court upheld the statute
criminalizing consensual gay and lesbian conduct because the right to privacy
did not protect such activity.184 Some of the activities protected by the right to
privacy are child rearing, education, family relationships, procreation,
marriage, contraception and abortion.185 The court in Bower's case afforded
the complainant no protection because such a matter did not involve a family.
However, in the case of Roe v Wade that dealt with a couple's right to have an
abortion, the right was upheld. The couple was unmarried. 186 This certainly
did not involve marriage or family.
Griswold v Connetticutl87 , Eistadt v Bairi 88 and Carey v Population Services
Internationaz1 89 were all cases that dealt with access to contraceptives. Bowers
v Hardwick 190 regarded the aforementioned cases as being irrelevant as if they
dealt merely with buying pharmaceutical products. In all of these cases, the
182 381 V. S. 479 (1965).
183 478 V. S. 186 (1986) 106 S. Ct..
184 Ibid, at 2844.
185 Wishard op cit note 179, at 422.
186 410 V.S. 113 (1973).
187 381 V.S. 479 (1965).
188 405 V.S. 438 (1972).
189 431 V.S. 678 (1977).
190 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
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plaintiff was seeking constitutional protection of intimate human relationships.
Tribe submits that in a case where the conduct was behind closed doors and
where the participants were consenting adults, the State of Georgia must
. 'fy' If £'. b' . H d . k' 191 B U dw' kIn tJustl Itse lor emg m ar WIC s room. owers v .l1ar IC was no
decided on legal principle but on prejudice which is evident in the judgement
of the dissenting judges which refers to the majority's "almost obsessive focus
on gay and lesbian activity". Hardwick and his partner were adults and by
mutual consent engaged in sexual relations. There is no need for the state to
protect such conduct. It is understandable that the state protects individuals
regarding rape and paedophilia as the latter lacks consent. In Bowers v
Hardwick 193the privacy argument was not extended to gay and lesbian
conduct.
The Equal Protection Clause is contained in the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The right to equal protection is expressly stated in
the Constitution, unlike the right to privacy.
Unlike our equality clause, the Equal Protection Clause makes no specific
mention of the protected categories. It does not include "such as" or "other
status" clauses. The inclusion or the exclusion of the categories has been left
to the judiciary. In order for homosexuality to be included as a category and to
receive protection, it has to be classified. In the United States there are three
different classifications which operate under different levels of scrutiny.
Statutes or prohibitions by the state that discriminate on the basis of race or
191 Tribe op cit note 177, at 2853.
192 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et, at 2843 - 2844.
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national ongm are subject to strict scrutiny and are known as "suspect
classification". These laws would only be constitutional if they served a
compelling interest of the state. 194 Then there are laws which whilst
discriminating against a certain group of persons protect another group, for
example gender laws protecting women, may discriminate against men. This is
known as the "quasi-suspect class". This particular class is subject to
"intermediate scrutiny". It is therefore important that sexual orientation
becomes classified as one of the aforementioned. If the discrimination does
not fall into the suspect class or the quasi suspect class then there is a greater
burden on the complainant to prove the illegitimacy of the State, rather than
the State justifying its conduct and proving its legitimacy.195 Therefore in
order for gays and lesbians to receive protection under the equal protection
clause it has to be classified as "suspect" or a "quasi-suspect" class. However
in Bowers v Hardwick l96 the court stressed that it was not deciding its case on
the Equal Protection Clause and did not categorize homosexuality into any of
the classes.
In Watkins v US Army, 197 The court looked at three requirements that needed
fulfillment before ascertaining whether the classification was suspect or quasi
suspect. The requirements are:
(1) That the particular group in question has a history ofdiscrimination;198
193 Ibid.
193 Tribe op cit note 177, at 1063 - 80.
194
E Heinze Sexual Orientation: A Human Right (1995) 232.
195 478 V.S. 186 (1986) 106 C. et, at 196.
196 847 F. 2d 1329 (9th Cire. 1988).
197 Ibid, at 1345 - 1346.
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(2) That the discrimination has embodied a gross unfairness; and
199
(3) That the class has been "politically powerless" both historically and by
being in the minority?OO
In the Watkins case201 , the court found that gays and lesbians did have a
history of discrimination. As far as the second requirement in concerned, the
court looked at three factors, which constitute "gross unfairness" namely:
(1) Whether gays and lesbians belonged to a group which is unable to
contribute to society;·
(2) That the disabilities that gays and lesbians face is as a result of societal
prejudice rather than logical argument or reason; and
(3) That the characteristics ofa group are immutable.
The question of immutability has already been discussed earlier.202
With regard to the third requirement, of being "politically powerless", the
courts looked at whether that particular class belonged to a minority group
because minority groups are usually unrepresented?03Sexual orientation was
found to be a suspect class hence requiring strict scrutiny by the courts.
198 Ibid, at 1345 - 1346.
199 Ibid, at 1348.
201 847 F. 2d 1329 (9th Cire. 1988).
201 See Chapter I.
202 Ibid, at 1348.
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Since the Bower'i04 decision, it has been understood that discrimination
against gays and lesbians is allowed. In 1987, a year after the Bowers v
HardwicK05 decision, in Padula v Webster206 a lesbian who had applied for
employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation was turned down
because of her homosexuality. The court held that in light of the milestone
decision ofBowers v Hardwick/07 the plaintiff in this case had not suffered a
violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause.
In another case, Woodward v United States, 208 the plaintiff challenged his
dismissal from the Navy in terms of the Due Process clause and the right to
Freedom of Association. Strangely enough, the court cited Padula's case
wherein the plaintiffs argument was based on a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 209 The courts seemed to regard the Equal Protection and
the Due Process clauses as being one and the same. Sunstein, in his analysis
of Bowers v Hardwick,2IO argues that the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause are distinct from each other. Bower's case was unsuccessful as
far as the Due Process clause goes. Sunstein argues that the fact that certain
laws challenged under one clause failed does not mean that it will also be
unsuccessful under another clause.2II The liberty of an individual is
entrenched in the Due Process Clause.
203 C. J Joslin 'Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy ofBowers v
Hardwick - Romers v Evans 116 S.ct. 1620 (1996)' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties
Law Review 225, at 227.
204 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
20S 822 F. 2d 97 D.C. Cir. 1987.
206 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
207 871 F. 2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
208 822 F. 2d 97 D.C. Cir. 1987.
209 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
210
C Sunstein Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship between Due
Process and Equal Protection (1998) 55 University o/Chicago Law Review 1161, at 1168.
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In terms ofthe 5th Amendment:
"No person shall.... be deprived of life, liberty of
·h d fl ,,212property, Wit out ue process 0 aw.
The fourteenth amendment, which binds the state, stipulates:
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without the due process of law."
The due process clause is thus a means of judicial review by the courts to
protect the liberty of individuals.
In attempting to seek protection for gays and lesbians, and in searching for
loopholes in the Bower v Hardwick decision/ i3 lawyers have emerged with
various legal arguments. One such argument is that Bowers v HardwicK14
upheld the sodomy statute on the basis of the Due Process of law. Hence gays
and lesbians may now challenge laws regarding their sexual orientation under
the Equal Protection clause.215
Ten years later, the case of Romer v Evans 216 caused a serious shift of focus
from the Bowers era.217 Since this decision the courts don't blindly follow the
211 •
This clause commands the federal government.
212 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et
213 Ibid.
214 Sunstein op cit note 210.
215 116 S.ct 1620 (1996).
216 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et
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precedent laid down in Bowers v Hardwick,218 which allowed discrimination
against gays and lesbians.
The court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado Constitution was invalid in
that it violated the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution of the United
States.219 The effect of Amendment 2 was that it would repeal all laws, which
discriminated against gays and lesbians, and it would also prohibit the
enactment of further laws that protect gays and lesbians.22o Discrimination
would not be allowed but at the same time, gays and lesbians would not
receive protection. There were two legs of argument:
(i) The Equal Protection clause; and
(ii) The rational basis test.
In adopting the aforementioned test, the court questioned whether the
legislation was connected to a legitimate state interest.221 When a particular
group is disadvantaged or targeted for discriminatory treatment, then the
courts need to establish after careful examination, what the intent of the state
is.222 However, the courts did not grant gays and lesbians "suspect-class"
status.223 Therefore since the Romer v Evani24 decision, legislation affecting
gays and lesbians is not automatically subject to strict scrutiny.
217 Ibid.
218 116 S. et. 1620 (1996), at 1623.
219 Ibid, at 1626.
220 116 S. et. 1620 (1996), at 1629.
221 Joslin op cit note 203, at 243.
222 Ibid, at 237.
223 116 S. et. 1620 (1996), at 1629.
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To summarize, the position is that Bowers v Hardwick
225
seemed to have shut
the doors for gays and lesbians thus curtailing legal argument and causing a
major stumbling block for their lawyers. Then followed Romer v Evans
226
ten
years later, preventing discrimination against gays and lesbians, a decision
welcomed by the gay community. Bowers v HardwicJC
27
dealt with
criminalisation of gay and lesbian sexual conduct. The writer is of the view
that, the decriminalization of private sexual conduct between two consenting
adults is very important and is related to family aspects like custody and
access because the rights of gay parents cannot be protected if the law regards
their sexual conduct as an offence.
About the same time as Romer v Evans228 was the case of Baehr v Miike?29
The plaintiffs challenged the refusal of marriage licenses by the Department of
Health. The Supreme Court ofHawaii held that there was an onus on the State
to prove that there was a compelling State interest for refusing the application.
The defendant alleged inter alia that it had a "compelling interest to promote
the optimal development ofchildren ... It is the State ofHawaii's position that,
all things being equal, it is best for a child that it be raised in a single home by
its parents or at least by a married male and female ...,,230 It was argued by the
defendant that if same sex marriages were to be recognized, gay parents would
become more involved with the rearing of children. Expert witnesses were
called by the defence. According to Dr Pruetl, an expert for the defence, a
224 478 V.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
225 116 S. et. 1620 (1996).
226 478 V.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
227 116 S. et. 1620 (1996).
228 1996 WL 694235 (Haw.Cir. Ct. 1996) http://www.grd.org/usa/legal/hawaii/baebr-v-mike : txt.
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parent's homosexuality would not disqualify him or her because they could be
just as capable and loving as their heterosexual counterparts.
231
Another
defence expert witness, Dr Eggbeen, submitted that children in a gay and
lesbian household were similar to those raised by step-parents and experienced
severe problems. 232 However, he later conceded that gay or lesbian couples
could provide a stable family environment.233 The last expert witness for the
defence was Dr Merrill, who testified that parental fitness was not affected by
sexual orientation.234 The court held that the most significant factor was the
nurturing relationship between parent and child. It was further held that gays
and lesbians were capable of raising happy well-adjusted children235 It was
decreed that the defendant could not deny an application for a marriage license
solely on the basis of the applicants being of the same sex. In response to the
Supreme Court of Hawaii decision, the Legislature re-enacted the laws
regarding marriage in that it would remain a union between a man and a
woman.236 There was a concern that if the State of Hawaii were to award
same-sex couples the right to marry, many from the United States of America
would go there to solemnize their unions. This would create the problem of
States having to deal with the recognition of such unions. In 1999 in response
to the dilemma and in refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, twenty nine
States adopted non-recognition Legislation.237
229 Ibid, at para 19.
230 Ibid, at para 31-35.
231 Ibid, at para 49.
232 Ibid, at para 51.
233 Ibid, at para 71.
234 Ibid, at para 125.
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It is very important to establish the perceptions that society has regarding gays and
sodomy because these perceptions are carried into the courtroom. It is these negative
perceptions that could account for the biases held by many judicial officers. An
examination of Bowers v HardwicK38 reveals that sodomy was a crime, and gay and
lesbian sexual relations were not protected by the law. One can therefore hardly
expect to fmd an environment of tolerance and acceptance of gays and lesbians in the
courtroom. Hence, contrary to the best interest rule, the judge SI own biases came to
the fore. Their wide discretionary powers allowed for such biases.239 In light of the
aforementioned discussion the irrebuttable presumption approach was not surprising.
This approach is illogical, presumptuous and discriminatory in that it concludes
without evidence that the gay or lesbian parent is neither fit nor capable of being a
parent.
The nexus approach seems to be more in line with the recognition ofhuman rights. In
the majority ofcases where the nexus approach was adopted, the court's award was in
favour ofthe gay or lesbian parent, having found no detrimental effect on the children
d 240 Q . h . M S 241conceme. uIte to t e contrary, ill .P. V .P, the court found that the mother's
lesbianism would positively impact on her daughters and would instill in them
maturity and character. Bezio v Patenaude242 must be commended for the test that it
237 478 D.S. 186 (1986) 106 S. et.
238 Ali op eit note 123.
239
People v Brown; Leonard v Leonard; Smith v Smith;
MP. v s.p; Bezio v Patenaude; Doe v Doe;
Guinan v Guinan; MA.B. v R B.
240 404 A 2d 1256 (N.J. Super. 1979).
241 410 N. E. 2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
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introduced. The court was of the opinion that there should not only be a nexus
between the parent's homosexuality and a negative effect on the child, but that there
must be demonstrable evidence of such effect.
The court in Kallas v Kalla;43 appeared hypocritical when they stated on one hand,
that there was no bar to homosexuality but denied sleepovers on the other, without
any evidence or forwarding any explanation for such denial. A similar decision was
taken in the case of NK.M v L.E.M?44 The court in the aforementioned case also
seemed to hide behind the farcical approach that there was "no automatic bar" to
custody, only to deny custody without any evidence. There was no evidence of a
negative or detrimental effect on the child concerned but the court was concerned
about possible future harm. This surely smacks of prejudice and bias. The writer
submits that documented evidence indicative of harm to the child needs to be placed
before the court.
The discrimination was glaringly obvious in the case ofMJ.P v J. G. p245 because all
the evidence pointed to the mother as the most suitable parent, but she was denied
custody. This decision was made even though it was contrary to the interests of the
child. The writer agrees with the submission ofRosenblum that the nexus approach is
the more "logical" one, however the latter cases reveal that courts hover behind the
curtains of this approach only to camouflage their deep seated prejudices and
biases.246 The third approach adopted by American courts, that of imposition of
conditions, is one that assumes that homosexuality is "bad" and children should not be
242 614P. 2d641 (Utah 1980).
243 606 S.W. 2d 179, 183 (MO. et. App. 1980).
244 640 P. 2d 966 (1982).
245 Rosenblum op cit note 166.
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exposed thereto. This approach is farcical and like any other approach not supported
by evidence, highly prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION
Sexual orientation is an enumerated ground in the Equality clause. The Best Interest
Rule which governs custody and access disputes in South Africa has no clear
guidelines. 1 The judge has to rely on a value system. The decisions may therefore
reflect the values as well as the prejudices of the community and the judge. The judge
has a wide discretion. This wide discretion results in the disparity of decisions. The
problem is increased when the litigant in the custody or access dispute is a gay or
lesbian parent. Homophobic attitudes may then come to the fore. The writer does not
propose the enactment of legislation for the granting of custody or access to gay or
lesbian parents? Such legislation would have no effect unless proper guidelines are
set in place. The writer sees a need for the Constitutional Court to lay down proper
guidelines. A proper set of guidelines would avoid lengthy, expensive and protracted
litigation, which causes great acrimony for all parties, including the children. It needs
to be established that the best interest rule that applies in all custody and access cases
is also operative, when the parent happens to be gay or lesbian.
By refusing custody or access and by imposing unjustified conditions, the courts
would be perpetuating homophobia and prejudice instead of attempting to eradicate it.
The study of the fears held by gay and lesbian parents reveals that there is no basis,
which can be countenanced before the law for treating gay and lesbian parents
differently. Homosexuality per se should not be the issue.
1 A Pantazis 'Children's Rights' in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz and Woolman
Constitutional Law ofSouth Africa led (1996) 33-1.
Instead, there must be a common objective of both the courts and the parents, to place
the child with the parent who is most able to care for, protect and educate the child.
The nexus approach which the American courts use seems to be the most logical.
According to this approach, the homosexuality of the parent would be taken into
account if it were detrimental to the interests of the child. The writer fmds the test laid
down in Bezio v Patenaude 3 to be useful. The court held that there must be
"demonstrable" evidence that the parent's homosexuality has negatively affected the
child. We must not be lulled into a false sense of security because we have a Bill of
Rights, as does Canada. Yet the majority of Canadian cases are based on the open-
discreet test. This test is dependent on how discreet or overt the homosexual parent is,
regarding his or her sexual orientation. It would be detrimental if South African courts
were to follow in these footsteps. It would be discriminatory if South African courts
were to reward discreet gay and lesbian parents, by awarding custody or granting more
liberal access. Such an attitude presumes that homosexuality is immoral or wrong.
Majoritarian views are not necessarily the correct one. Gays and lesbians have the
right to live their lives both in the bedroom and in public, freely, and to the same
extent as all South Africans.
The court has to deal with the fact that the child would be teased and stigmatised by
his peers. The writer agrees with the Australian authorities,4 that exposure of the
children to the different lifestyles would cause them to mature. Palmore v Sidoti5 has
2 Save for section 6(1)(b) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
3410 N.E. 2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
4 Spry V Spry (1997) F.L.C ,at 76,447, Jannan v Lloyd (1982) 8 Fam. L.R. 878, at 890.
5466 V.S. 429 (1984).
indicated that if a court were to deny custody on the premise that the child would be
teased, that court would be condoning society's prejudices. The writer submits that the
latter would perpetuate homophobia. The court's role is to eradicate it and not
perpetuate it. If the gay parent were to be refused custody but still maintains contact by
exercising rights of access, the interaction would still cause the child to be teased. The
court must be satisfied that the denial would cause the harassment to be eradicated.6
Boyd advocates that there are differences between the heterosexual and the gay and
lesbian parent. She submits that the courts place an onus on the heterosexual parent to
assist the child, in understanding and accepting the gay or lesbian parent. The child
concerned would need to deal with stigmatisation by peers and homophobic
community attitudes. The role of the heterosexual parent would be to counsel and
support the child in this regard.7
There is also a definite need for independent representation for the children. The best
interests of the child have been constitutionalised by section 28 of the Constitution.
This provision places a burden on the State to provide mechanisms for the protection
and interests of the child, independent child representation is tantamount to such
protection. Considering South Africa's economy, creation of new structures would
place further fmancial burden. The state already has a structure in place, which is the
family advocate.
6 MP. v s.p 169 N.J Super 425, at 436-39,404 A. 2d 1256., 1263 (App. Div 1979).
7 S.B Boyd "Lesbian (and Gay) Custody Claims: What Difference does Difference make?" (1997) 15
Canadian Journal ofFamily Law 131, at 145.
The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act8 provides for the family advocate. The
function of the family advocate is to hold an enquiry with both parents and children
and then to make the necessary recommendations. The State needs to grant new
directives to the family advocates regarding its function. The family advocate must
not only be present but must actively participate in the proceedings, thus protecting the
interests of the child. Although courts are guided by the recommendations of the
family advocate, there is little clarity as to the evidentiary value of such
recommendation.9 In the 1994 case Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,1O the court did not
accept the family advocate's report. The writer proposes that section 6(1)(b)11 be
amended to give legal status to the report of the family advocate. The latter is in an
invidious position because he or she has had personal interviews with all parties,
including the children. The transformation regarding family law has already begun.
Durban has a Family Centre situated at the Magistrates Court. Integral to the
programme, is the training of family court officers. The writer submits that the
training ought to include a series of seminars regarding custody and access disputes
involving gay and lesbian parents. Although the State must be commended for its
efforts in transformation, the writer submits that there is a dire need for Family Centres
in rural areas. Magistrates are authorised by virtue of the Child Care Actl2 to remove
children from their homosexual parents as was done in the case of Greyling v Minister
of Welfare and Population Development and Others. 13 A gay or lesbian parent in a
8 Act 24 of 1987 see also section 6(1)(b) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
9 F.J Bosman and G.J Van Zyl "Children, Young Persons and their Parents" in lA Robinson The Law
a/Children and Young Persons (1997), at 65.
10 1994 (2) SA 325 (W).
11 Of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
12 Section 13 of the Child Care Act 75 of 1983.
13Case no: 98/8 197 - WLD, unreported.
rural area would not be in a fmancial position to apply to the High Court to overturn
the lower court decision. There is therefore a need for all family magistrates both in
the cities and rural areas to receive adequate training. It is hoped that there would be
equality for all premised on our Bill ofRights but at the same time acknowledging that
the interests of the child is paramount.
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